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This dissertation advances a novel philosophical account of the relationship between brain 
mapping and cognitive theorizing in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research. I 
argue that testing hypotheses about human cognition and behavior with fMRI critically depends 
on bridging assumptions about how cognitive functions map onto the brain. I demonstrate that in 
light of recent theoretical (e.g., network thinking) and methodological (e.g., resting state fMRI) 
advancements, these bridging assumptions are often problematic. I conclude that at this stage of 
scientific development, fMRI research should focus on articulating and testing new bridging 
assumptions rather than testing psychological theories. 
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1.0 DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
 
Cognitive neuroscience is a scientific discipline that seeks to understand the brain basis of human 
thought and behavior. By its very nature, cognitive neuroscience spans many fields of scientific 
inquiry, including linguistics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and neurobiology. A central 
philosophical issue in cognitive neuroscience concerns whether it is possible—and if so, how—
to integrate these diverse fields (Craver 2007, Sullivan 2009). Some researchers have argued that 
cognitive neuroscience is a “troubled marriage” of psychology and brain research (Cooper and 
Shallice 2010). That is, there is controversy over whether and how studying the brain informs 
our scientific understanding of mental processes such as thoughts or emotions (Hatfield 2000, 
Uttal 2001). 
One major area of cognitive neuroscience, human brain mapping or cerebral 
cartography, has two broad goals. The first is to localize cognitive functions—broadly construed 
to include affective and perceptual processes—onto structures of the brain. For example, one 
might want to know what part(s) of the brain are responsible for “disgust,” “face recognition,” 
“working memory,” etc. The second is to use these mappings—e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is involved in working memory—to test cognitive theories. For example, Gauthier and 
Tarr (2000) used neuroimaging to study whether humans possess a system dedicated to 
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recognizing conspecific faces. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a neuroimaging 
technique that measures changes in blood oxygenation due to neural activity, is currently the 
dominant tool in cognitive neuroscience for both of these purposes (Poldrack 2008, Aguirre 
2014). That is, neuroimagers use fMRI to map functions onto the brain and to test psychological 
theories. But despite its popularity, the use of fMRI for these purposes is fraught with 
controversy. While some neuroscientists think we can use neuroimaging to revolutionize our 
conception of the mind (Anderson 2014, 2015), others have denounced neuroimaging as a “new 
phrenology,” a circular experimental paradigm that can tell us little (maybe nothing) new about 
the mind (Van Orden and Paap 1997, Uttal 2001). 
How successful is the project of using fMRI for brain mapping, and for testing cognitive 
hypotheses? In other words, how does fMRI inform our best understanding of the functions 
performed by different parts of the brain, and how do fMRI findings bear on our best cognitive 
theories? Second, how are these projects related—that is, how does the use of fMRI for brain 
mapping inform the use of fMRI for testing cognitive hypotheses?  These are foundational, yet 
unresolved questions in the philosophy of neuroscience and psychology, though many 
philosophers (Bechtel 2008, Roskies 2009, Klein 2012, Rathkopf 2013,) and philosophically 
minded neuroscientists (Coltheart 2004, 2006, Anderson 2010, 2014, Poldrack 2006, 2010, 
Chatham and Badre 2015) have recently written about them. 
There is a great deal of philosophical interest in how functional attribution works in the 
biomedical sciences (e.g., Cummins 1975, Craver 2001) and on the research strategy of 
functional localization (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 1993). And philosophers have sometimes 
weighed in on whether fMRI is valuable for testing cognitive theories (e.g., Fodor 1999). But 
there is currently no general account in the philosophical literature on the relationship between 
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human brain mapping and the value of fMRI for testing psychological hypotheses. My aim in 
this dissertation is to remedy this situation by advancing a novel account of the relationship 
between human brain mapping and cognitive theorizing in fMRI research. Of course, this 
dissertation owes a debt to many established philosophers (Bechtel 2008, Lloyd 2000, Roskies 
2009, Klein 2010b, Machery 2012, 2013) whose excellent work on neuroimaging has paved the 
way for a new generation of philosophers (Rathkopf 2013, Nathan and Del Pinal 2016, Povich 
2015) to write on these issues. 
Part of my project is descriptive. I aim to demonstrate what assumptions about the 
brain—e.g., if some region is active in two circumstances, it is “doing the same thing” in both 
cases—underlie the inferences neuroscientists draw from fMRI experiments. Neuroscientists are 
not always explicit about the logic of their experimental practices, and this can make it difficult 
to critically assess them. Part of my project is normative. I also aim to critique current 
neuroimaging practices, illustrating what theoretical inferences are, or are not, permitted by 
current experimental techniques. I consider this dissertation an instance of “philosophy of 
science in practice.” That is, I attempt to show that genuinely philosophical analyses—e.g., 
theories of what functions are (Cummins 1975), or analyses of the relationship between theory 
and evidence (Nathan and Del Pinal 2016)—can help cognitive neuroscientists understand better 
understand their work and its limitations. Ultimately, I hope that my analysis will be useful for 
philosophers interested in the sciences of the mind and brain, philosophers who use fMRI 
findings to assess philosophical theories (e.g., empirically-oriented moral psychologists), and for 
cognitive scientists interested in the theoretical foundations of fMRI. 
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1.2 HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The question of how functions map onto the brain is one of the perennial issues in cognitive 
neuroscience. This is as true now as it was at the inception of the field. The 19th Century 
witnessed an explosion of scientific interest in the localization of functions in the human brain. 
Franz Gall (1758-1828), Jean Pierre Flourens (1794-1867), Paul Broca (1824-1880), David 
Ferrier (1843-1928), and many others all developed theories of how mental functions map onto 
the human cerebrum. Some, like Gall, were localizationists who believed that mental faculties—
e.g., a sense of language or mathematics—could be localized to specific brain convolutions or 
gyri. Others, like Flourens, were equipotentialists who believed that the cerebrum acted en masse 
to produce thought and behavior (Mundale 2002). A brief analysis of Gall’s phrenological 
system will illustrate many of the issues still live in brain mapping research today.1 
At a basic level, cerebral cartography involves relating a set of mental faculties or 
cognitive functions to a set of neural structures such as cerebral gyri, Brodmann’s 
cytoarchitecturally-defined regions, or widely distributed brain networks. This process involves: 
(1) A way of individuating or taxonomizing mental faculties, and (2) Experimental techniques 
and rules for mapping those faculties onto the brain. Franz Gall’s phrenological system offered a 
surprisingly modern way of individuating mental faculties. Where previous thinkers had largely 
relied on introspection to identify a small number of coarse-grained faculties such as 
“imagination,” “the intellect,” or “the will,” Gall developed a taxonomy consisting of dozens 
more abilities such as “sense of locality,” “faculty for words, verbal memory” and “arithmetic, 
                                                
1 Mundale (2002) helpfully distinguishes between equipotentialism (the view that cerebral cortex exhibits virtually 
no functional specialization) with holism (the view that nearly all of the brain is involved in performing most 
cognitive functions. 
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counting, and time” (Poldrack 2010). Gall identified these faculties based on observations that 
children could have poetic talent, but not musical talent, or that patients with brain injuries could 
exhibit impaired mathematical intelligence, but spared verbal intelligence. Then, Gall mapped 
these faculties onto the brain by correlating personality and intelligence traits with convolutions 
of the skull. While Gall’s method of individuating faculties is thought to have some merit, Gall 
was wrong that skull bumps correspond to cognitive capacities in any interesting sense 
(Anderson 2014, Ch. 1). 
While some 20th century neuroscientists (e.g., Lashley 1933) have championed the idea 
that the cortex acts as a whole, most neuroscientists believe that the cortex exhibits a high degree 
of functional specialization, such that cognitive functions can be localized to individual regions 
(Kanwisher et al. 1997) or networks of regions working in a concerted fashion (Mesulam 1990, 
McIntosh 2000).  The early experiments of Paul Broca, David Ferrier, and others won the day 
over holist alternatives. And while some psychologists (e.g., Uttal 2001) deny that it is possible 
to carve the mind at its functional joints, most believe that neuropsychological studies (Shallice 
1988) and behavioral studies (Petersen and Fiez 1993) can reveal the existence of distinct 
cognitive components. Thus, while some psychologists denigrate the use of fMRI for brain 
mapping as a “new phrenology” (more on this below), the enterprise as it was conceived in the 
1990s does resemble phrenology in its basic respects. That is, neuroscientists adopted a method 
where they individuated the components of the mind via behavioral studies or neuropsychology 
experiments (a taxonomic project), and then used neuroimaging to map these components onto 
the brain (a cartographic project). In this context, the main questions of my dissertation are: (1) 
How do cognitive neuroscientists develop their taxonomies of psychological kinds, (2) How do 
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neuroscientists map these kinds onto the brain?, and (3) Can facts about the brain actually 
influence our understanding of those cognitive kinds? 
 
1.3 CONTROVERSIES ABOUT FMRI 
 
Functional MRI involves placing participants in a strong magnetic field (generally about 2 Tesla) 
and measuring local changes in blood oxygenation—called the blood oxygen dependent or 
“BOLD” response—in a set of brain “voxels” (volumetric pixels) (Banich and Compton 2010, 
Aguirre 2014). Fluctuations in the BOLD signal are considered a proxy for the metabolic activity 
of neural populations, such that some BOLD signal changes reflect changes in neural activation 
patterns as opposed to artifacts of cerebral vasculature flow, head motion, scanning procedures, 
etc. (Logothetis 2003). Standard univariate practices involve a obtaining an anatomical image, 
obtaining functional data, submitting these data to a number of corrections (e.g., spatial 
smoothing or head motion corrections), fitting the hemodynamic response to a general linear 
model (GLM), and finally, generating a statistical parametric map (SPM) of which voxels 
exhibiting significant changes to a contrast of interest (Buxton 2002, Banich and Compton 
2010). It is important to note that fMRI does not produce functional “images” of the brain; the 
colored blobs in fMRI studies reflect statistically significant BOLD changes produced by 
applying statistics (including correcting for multiple comparisons, etc.) to a complex model of 
the raw data (Klein 2010a).  
In the early days of neuroimaging (Petersen and Fiez 1993, Posner and Raichle 1998), 
cognitive neuroscientists developed an agenda for localizing cognitive functions onto the brain 
and then using these localizations to test psychological theories. In the first step, researchers 
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employ subtractive neuroimaging, which utilizes both cognitive subtraction and BOLD signal 
subtraction prior to statistical comparisons (see Banich and Compton 2010 for a more detailed 
description) to localize cognitive functions to particular brain areas. Henson (2006) calls this 
form of function-to-structure inference “forward inference.” For instance, researchers might 
subtract the patterns of brain activation in a standard speech comprehension task from patterns of 
activation in a Phonological Loop Task (a speech comprehension task designed to recruit 
working memory) to isolate activity related to working memory. This purportedly works because 
speech comprehension is a “matched control” for a Phonological Loop Task—that is, the tasks 
putatively differ only in terms of whether working memory is recruited or not. This assumption 
is known as “pure insertion” in the philosophical and scientific literature (Van Orden and Paap 
1997). 
In the second step, researchers use these localizations to test hypotheses in cognitive 
psychology. For instance, subtraction studies suggest that working memory elicits activation in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Using this knowledge, researchers might design experiments 
designed to probe whether a novel task (e.g., doing long division) also recruits working memory 
by testing whether that task also elicits activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This 
pattern of structure-to-function inference, which Poldrack (2006) calls “reverse inference,” is a 
common practice in cognitive neuroscience. 
Together, forward inference and reverse inference present what we might call the 
“Standard Picture” of cerebral cartography. According to this picture, fMRI is good for testing 
cognitive theories in virtue of being good for localizing functions onto the brain. In the first 
pass—i.e. forward inference—neuroscientists localize cognitive functions—e.g., theory of 
mind—onto particular brain regions—e.g., right temporoparietal junction and associated regions. 
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In the second pass, researchers ask how these regions of interest respond to other stimuli or tasks. 
For example, Gauthier et al. (2000, see also Gauthier and Tarr 2000) ask whether the fusiform 
face area (isolated by contrasting faces versus other sufficiently complex objects) responds just 
to faces, or also other categories for which participants are experts (e.g., birds and cars). Or, 
researchers might see if a novel task—e.g., a moral judgment—recruits some psychological 
function of interest—e.g., disgust—based on whether it recruits regions associated with that 
function. The latter is an example of reverse inference. 
There is a great deal of controversy about whether these practices rest on firm theoretical 
foundations. According to some theorists (Van Orden and Paap 1997, Uttal 2001), fMRI is not 
even useful for localizing cognitive functions onto the brain. These criticisms often hinge on the 
notion that the assumption of pure insertion used in subtraction studies —i.e. that researchers can 
identify tasks that differ solely in the recruitment of one cognitive process or function—assumes 
a simplistic, modular view of cognition. For example, a researcher might suppose that the only 
difference between the word, “DOG,” and the non-word, “BLORT,” is that one involves 
semantic access. This assumption might be illegitimate, since the word “DOG” not only involves 
semantic access, but perhaps also mental imagery, emotional processes, etc. Van Orden and Paap 
(1997) argue that pure insertion is not only unjustified; in many cases, it is demonstrably false 
(see Friston et al. 1997). 
Another common criticism is that since subtraction studies will always reveal some peak 
BOLD signal difference (these peaks are usually obtained after correcting for multiple statistical 
comparisons), neuroimagers can localize whatever function they imagine to be the difference 
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between two tasks onto that activation peak (Van Orden and Paap 1997, Poldrack 2010).2 In a 
provocative (perhaps humbling) thought experiment, Poldrack imagines that if Franz Gall had 
possessed an fMRI machine, he could have used BOLD changes to find the neural basis of 
sagacity, poetic talent, murderousness, aptness to receive an education, or virtually any of his 
faculties (2010, 754). 
Other theorists argue that fMRI is useful for localizing cognitive functions onto the brain, 
but not for testing psychological hypotheses (Fodor 1999, Coltheart 2004, 2006). For example, 
Coltheart (2004, 2006) argues that since psychological theories do not make predictions about 
patterns of brain activation, neuroimaging results cannot—in principle—support or contradict a 
cognitive theory. By contrast, many researchers (e.g., Henson 2005) argue that fMRI is an 
indispensible tool for testing cognitive hypotheses. Some neuroscientists go so far as to claim 
that fMRI can be used to discover new psychological constructs (Anderson 2014, Ch. 4) or to 
revise our existing taxonomies of psychological kinds (Lenartowicz et al. 2010). Lindquist et al. 
(2012), for example, argue that fMRI results favor a social constructionist account of emotions 
over basic emotion theory. These proposals hearken back to the Churchlandian idea that familiar 
psychological categories will be eliminated or radically revised as brain research progresses 
(Churchland 1981). Thus there are deep theoretical disputes about the value of fMRI both for 
brain mapping and for testing cognitive theories.3 
 
 
 
                                                
2 See Roskies (2010) for a defense of subtraction against these charges. 
3 There are also disputes about specific experimental practices, rather than the value of the enterprise as a whole. For 
example, Poldrack (2006) argues that reverse inference is problematic since brain areas are activated in many 
different circumstances; Machery (2013) defends reverse inference against this charge.	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1.4 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
 
My dissertation advances a novel account of the relationship between brain mapping and 
cognitive theorizing in fMRI research. I argue that fMRI studies can, in principle, inform the 
development and assessment of cognitive theories. Their ability to do so, however, hinges on 
bridging assumptions specifying how cognitive functions map onto the brain (see also Roskies 
2009, Coltheart 2013, Nathan and Del Pinal 2016, Chatham and Badre 2015). The problem is 
that the landscape of human brain mapping is rapidly changing due to new techniques (e.g., 
resting state fMRI) and theoretical approaches (e.g., network-oriented mapping). These shifts 
undermine the assumptions—e.g., “each brain region performs a unique function”—that 
traditionally make fMRI results speak to cognitive theories. Therefore, many attempts to use 
fMRI to test psychological theories ultimately fail. I conclude that fMRI research should focus 
its research on developing new bridging assumptions rather than exclusively focusing on testing 
existing cognitive theories. Furthermore, the bridging assumptions that bring fMRI in contact 
with psychology will need to be sufficiently “local”—i.e. specific to inferences in particular 
experimental paradigms, about particular brain systems. 
In Chapter 2.0, I investigate the problem of multi-functionality in human brain mapping. 
Traditionally, cognitive neuroscientists have assigned one function (e.g., working memory or 
face recognition) to each brain region. But recent studies suggest that brain regions often have 
many different functions—for example, the cerebellum is involved not just in motor control, but 
also reading and spatial cognition. Multi-functionality undermines the search for systematic (i.e. 
selective) structure-function mappings. Philosophers and neuroscientists disagree about how 
brain mapping should proceed in light of multi-functionality. For example, Cathy Price and Karl 
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Friston (2005) argue that each region does perform a unique function, but that neuroscientists 
need to develop a new taxonomy of cognitive functions to capture what these regions are doing. 
In contrast, Colin Klein (2012) argues that neuroscientists should abandon the idea that each 
region performs a single function in favor of context-sensitive mappings. I argue that we are 
unlikely to find a general strategy for mapping functions onto multi-functional brain regions. 
Drawing on causal role theories of function in the philosophical literature, I argue that there is no 
canonical structure-function relationship for multi-functional components in biological systems, 
including the human brain. This “Functional Heterogeneity Hypothesis” holds that the brain 
contains different kinds of multi-functional parts; thus there is no general solution to the puzzle 
presented by multi-functional brain areas. 
In Chapter 3.0, I critique the “cognitive ontology revision” movement in cognitive 
neuroimaging. Recently, several prominent neuroscientists such as Russ Poldrack (2010) and 
Michael Anderson (2010, 2014, 2015) have argued that neuroimaging evidence compels a 
revision of psychological kinds. Throughout history, psychologists have often revised their 
psychological categories—e.g., “memory” was split into procedural and declarative variants. 
Contemporary neuroscientists often hold that fMRI should play an important role in such 
revisions—i.e. the lumping, splitting, etc. of cognitive kinds such as “working memory” or 
“anger.” For example, some neuroscientists claim that fMRI evidence contradicts basic emotion 
theory, which holds that emotions fall into discrete categories such as disgust, anger, fear, 
happiness, etc. If fMRI evidence should be used for the assessment of psychological categories, 
this has profound implications for the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience. I identify two 
strategies for conducting fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision. The first asks whether brain 
data “matches” predictions of psychological theories—e.g., basic emotion theory allegedly 
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predicts that regions involved in emotions will be specific to one category, such as anger or fear. 
The second takes a set of existing constructs (e.g., working memory versus top-down attention), 
and asks whether they elicit similar or different brain activation patterns. I argue that the first 
approach relies on overly strong bridging assumptions about how cognitive functions map onto 
the brain, while the second relies on untested methodological assumptions. 
 In Chapter 4.0—co-authored with David Danks—I examine the prospects of using resting 
state fMRI to identify functional brain networks.4 In resting state fMRI, researchers collect data 
about what brain areas “communicate” with one another (called “functional connectivity 
patterns”) while participants rest in the scanner. What began as an accidental observation of 
patterned activity in the resting brain has become a major area of research. Many neuroscientists 
argue that the large-scale brain networks active at rest correspond to known brain networks (e.g., 
motor, visual, or attention networks), and thus resting state fMRI can be used to identify 
candidate functional brain networks in a “bottom up” fashion. This means researchers can 
discover new functional networks without making prior assumptions about the psychological 
differences between tasks, which is a radical departure from the stimulus-response paradigm 
characterizing much of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. I argue that resting state analyses 
involve sampling from a “mixture distribution” of unknown elements. After all, people lie in the 
scanner for hours, during which they perform any number of cognitive processes such as 
planning their day, remembering a vacation, or singing songs in their heads. The small number of 
large-scale, intrinsic networks identified in resting state research may reflect these psychological 
processes being blended together (across time) in the analysis rather than a feature of the brain’s 
functional organization. This suggests a need for methodological checks—e.g., statistical 
                                                
4	  We contributed equally to the co-authorship of Chapter 4. 
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“demixing” methods, or more participant self-reports—before we can say with confidence that 
resting state fMRI reveals candidate functional brain networks. 
 In Chapter 5.0, I conclude by describing the results of my analysis, and highlighting areas 
for further research. My main conclusion is that the value of fMRI for testing cognitive 
hypotheses depends on the validity of bridging assumptions about how cognitive functions map 
onto the brain. However, theories of the brain’s functional topography are shifting due to new 
methodological and theoretical developments. Thus, neuroscientists will need to evaluate their 
bridging assumptions. The upshot of this discussion is that the value of fMRI for testing 
cognitive theories is deeply tied up in our theories of the brain’s functional topography; as our 
conception of the brain changes, so too will the ways in which fMRI data bears on questions 
about the nature of the mind.  
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2.0 THE BRAIN’S HETEROGENEOUS FUNCTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
2.1 CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many neuroscientists assume that the cortex is a mosaic of functionally specialized regions, each 
of which performs a distinct cognitive function (Kanwisher 2010). Indeed, this “modular” picture 
informs a great deal of theorizing in cognitive neuroscience, either implicitly or explicitly. 
Current research suggests, however, that brain regions are often multi-functional (Anderson 
2010, 2014). That is, the same anatomical structures are often recruited for very different 
cognitive functions. To illustrate, consider the cerebellum. While the cerebellum is traditionally 
viewed as a motor area involved in balance and coordination, recent studies implicate the 
cerebellum in numerous cognitive functions such as reading, habit formation, and spatial 
reasoning (Raberger and Wimmer 2003, Schmamann and Caplan 2006). How should 
neuroscientists interpret these findings? Does the cerebellum perform one function in connection 
with these diverse abilities, or does it merely perform different functions at different times? 
Apparent cases of multi-functionality are ubiquitous in the human neocortex (Anderson 
2010, 2014). This finding raises significant challenges for structure-function mapping in 
cognitive neuroscience. Chiefly, multi-functionality confounds the search for systematic or 
selective mappings between specific brain regions—e.g., the fusiform face area—and particular 
cognitive functions—e.g., face recognition. Neuroscientists and philosophers disagree about how 
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structure-function mapping should proceed in light of multi-functionality. Cognitive 
neuroscientists Cathy Price and Karl Friston (2005) argue that brain regions perform many 
functions at one level of description, and a single, previously uncharacterized, function at 
another. Thus neuroscientists need to revise their cognitive ontologies—i.e. taxonomies of 
cognitive functions—to obtain systematic mappings. Philosopher Colin Klein (2012) draws a 
very different lesson from the same findings: since the functions of brain regions vary according 
to the functional networks in which they are embedded, neuroscientists should adopt context-
sensitive mappings rather than revise their cognitive ontologies. In other words, neuroscientists 
should give up on systematic mappings as an appropriate basis for theorizing (or accept that 
systematic mappings are not attainable for individual brain regions). 
In this chapter, drawing on causal role theories of function in the philosophical literature 
(Cummins 1975, Craver 2001), I contend that neither account will succeed as a general treatment 
of multi-functionality in cognitive neuroscience: Brain regions, like other biological components 
(e.g., genes, tissues, organs, etc.) are multi-functional in different ways—viz., it is plausible that 
the brain contains different kinds of multi-functional parts. Furthermore, different kinds of multi-
functional parts call for different functional mapping strategies. Therefore, there is probably no 
“one size fits all” solution to the puzzle presented by multi-functional brain regions. I call this 
the “Functional Heterogeneity Hypothesis.” As I will show later in the dissertation (particularly 
Chapters 3 and 5), both the existence of multi-functionality, and the fact that there is no obvious 
solution to it, has profound implications for what neuroscientists can infer from fMRI results. 
Thus multi-functionality at the level of regions forms the basis for rethinking what it means for 
neural functions to map onto brain structures.  
 First, I discuss the problem of multi-functionality in greater detail (2.2). Then I examine 
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different strategies for dealing with multi-functionality in the brain (2.3). Next I argue that the 
value of different mapping strategies (e.g., cognitive ontology revision versus context-sensitive 
mapping) depends on the mechanistic organization (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000, Craver 
2001) of the target system—i.e. on the kinds of multi-functional components one is dealing with. 
Furthermore, I argue that the brain areas, like genes and organs, are probably multi-functional in 
different ways. Components with conserved roles perform the same basic operation in different 
capacities while components with variable roles perform different functions at multiple levels of 
description (2.4). I conclude by highlighting some broader implications for human brain 
mapping, and for the use of functional neuroimaging to investigate human cognition (2.5). 
 
2.2 THE PROBLEM OF MULTI-FUNCTIONALITY 
 
Human brain mapping is one of the main goals of cognitive neuroscience. Some hypothesized 
(though debatable) brain mappings include the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) and theory 
of mind, (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003), the fusiform face area (FFA) and face recognition 
(Kanwisher et al. 1997), and Broca’s area and speech production (Tettamanti and Wenniger 
2006). Structure-function mapping would be simplest if the brain obeyed a strict one-to-one 
relationship between anatomical regions (e.g., the RTPJ) and cognitive functions (e.g., 
mindreading). Unfortunately, the brain violates this tidy arrangement in two ways. First, many 
cognitive functions—especially fairly complex ones such as speech comprehension—are 
presumably carried out by networks of regions working in concert rather than any individual 
region (McIntosh 2000). Second, the same anatomical regions (e.g., Broca’s area) often have 
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many different cognitive functions (Poldrack 2006, Anderson 2010). In other words, human 
brain areas are often multi-functional. 
Numerous studies report a high degree of multi-functionality in individual brain regions 
(Anderson 2010, 2014). Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies link the 
insula to many functions including gustation (taste), pain sensation, disgust, empathy, attention, 
and working memory (Menon and Uddin 2010).5 Broca’s area, classically associated with speech 
production, has recently been implicated in additional functions such as syntactic processing, 
action imitation, and semantics (Tettamanti and Wenniger 2006). In a striking meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies, cognitive scientist Michael Anderson (2010) reports that cortical areas are 
“re-deployed” on average across nine different cognitive domains such as vision, audition, 
memory, and numeric cognition. Thus multi-functionality may be a global feature of the brain’s 
functional organization.6 
In what sense are brain areas multi-functional and why is this a problem for human brain 
mapping? Since there are many different concepts of biological function (see Wouters 2005), it 
is important to clarify the relevant notion. According to Robert Cummins’ influential causal role 
account (1975), functional analysis involves decomposing a capacity ψ of some containing 
system S into a set of constituent operations or roles Фs that collectively perform that capacity.7 
For example, the capacity of breathing (ψ) performed by the human respiratory system (S) 
consists of roles including inhalation (Ф1), exhalation (Ф2), gas exchange (Ф3), and the control of 
breathing rhythm (Ф4). In this framework, the function of a component X is the role that X plays 
                                                
5 While many of the studies I cite are fMRI studies, multi-functionality is not just an artifact of cognitive 
neuroimaging. For example, neuropsychology studies corroborate the insula’s multi-functionality (see Ibañez, 
Gleichgerrcht and Manes 2010).  
6 Anderson’s case for massive redeployment needs further evaluation since the extent of multi-functionality depends 
on the size of the regions investigated and the chosen categories of cognitive domains.	  
7 I use the terms “role” and “operation” interchangeably to denote a sub-capacity Ф of some target capacity ψ.	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in S’s ability to ψ—e.g., the brainstem’s (X) role in breathing is the maintenance of breathing 
rhythm (Ф4).8 
Causal role functions nicely capture the sense in which brain areas are multi-functional.9 
Cognitive neuroscientists typically study complex cognitive capacities by decomposing them 
into a set of component operations—e.g., cognitive models of reading involve component 
operations such as attention, eye movement control, word form recognition and semantic access. 
Then neuroscientists use subtractive neuroimaging and other techniques to map these component 
operations onto the brain (Petersen and Fiez 1993).10 Thus structure-function mapping in 
cognitive neuroscience often involves specifying the role Ф a region plays in some cognitive 
capacity ψ. For example, the visual word form area’s role in reading is to process the shape of 
written characters (Dehaene et al. 2005). But just as many organs are recruited for multiple 
physiological capacities—e.g., the liver functions in fat digestion (ψ1) and blood sugar regulation 
(ψ2)—many brain areas are recruited for multiple cognitive capacities. For example, the insula is 
involved in both empathy (ψ1) and disgust (ψ2) (Menon and Uddin 2010). 
 Multi-functionality raises interpretive challenges for cognitive neuroscience (Price and 
Friston 2005, Anderson 2010, Klein 2012, Rathkopf 2013), particularly since the functions a 
region participates in often seem quite distinct from one another. To demonstrate, consider 
Broca’s area. Since the 19th century, Broca’s has been associated with speech production—i.e. 
the motor aspects of speech. However, recent studies implicate Broca’s area in a variety of non 
speech-related functions. For instance, Heiser and colleagues (2003) found that rTMS (a 
                                                
8 This assumes that roles can be mapped onto a particular component; this condition might fail in certain complex 
systems, where functions may be attributed to the whole (see Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Ch. 2).	  
9 This does not mean that every functional attribution in cognitive neuroscience designates a causal role. For 
instance, Garson (2011) may be right that some functional hypotheses concern a region’s developmental history.	  
10	  Of course, not every sub-capacity will map onto a single region. For example, eye movement control is thought to 
rely on a distributed network of cortical and subcortical structures (see Liversedge et al. 2000).	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technique that transiently “deactivates” brain tissue using magnetic pulses) of Broca’s area 
rendered participants unable to move their fingers in sequence with a recorded hand while 
preserving the basic ability to move their fingers. Meanwhile, Tettamanti and colleagues (2009) 
report that Broca’s area is involved in visuospatial learning. What does the recruitment of 
Broca’s area for speech production, action imitation, and visuospatial learning suggest about its 
function? Does Broca’s area perform a single function explaining its involvement in these 
different capacities, or does it perform different functions in different contexts? Simply listing 
the various cognitive functions associated with a region cannot resolve these issues. Therefore, 
neuroscientists need new strategies for functional mapping. 
 
2.3 FUNCTIONAL MAPPING STRATEGIES 
 
Human brain mapping often aims at “systematic” structure-function mappings (Price and Friston 
2005). Systematic mappings are those in which each structure of interest (e.g., dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) is uniquely associated with a particular cognitive function (e.g., working 
memory). According to a traditional view of brain mapping, the cortex is a patchwork of regions, 
each performing a single, unique function. The research I reviewed above suggests that this 
picture is wrong: Each region (as we know them) seems to perform many different cognitive 
functions (as we know them). There are many ways of responding to this situation. Perhaps there 
are systematic structure-function mappings, but not at the level of individual brain regions. Or 
perhaps brain regions do each perform a unique function, but we have the wrong set of functions 
for capturing what they are doing. Now I examine the strategies neuroscientists might adopt for 
dealing with multi-functionality, focusing on a recent debate between Price and Friston (2005) 
 20 
and Klein (2012). First, I briefly discuss a strategy that seeks to explain away the problem by 
dividing each multi-functional area into smaller functionally specific regions. 
2.3.1 Subdivide and conquer 
One strategy for dealing with multi-functionality is to divide the region in question into multiple 
functionally specific areas (e.g., Grill-Spector, Sayres, and Ress 2006, Fedoranko, Duncan, and 
Kanwisher 2012). According to this “subdivide and conquer” strategy, brain regions only appear 
multi-functional since current ways of delineating brain regions (e.g., BOLD dissociations in 
fMRI or cytoarchitectural maps) lump functionally distinct neural populations together (Grill-
Spector, Sayres, and Ress 2006). For example, while Mitchell (2008) claims that the RTPJ is 
involved in both attention and theory of mind (the ability to infer other agents’ mental states), 
Scholz and colleagues (2009) argue that different sub regions of the RTPJ perform these 
different functions. Similarly, Wager and Barrett (2004) argue that the insula contains distinct 
sub-regions involved in core affect (e.g., disgust expression), motivation and cognitive control, 
and pain. 
New techniques such as fMRI adaptation (Price and Friston 2005) and high-resolution 
fMRI (Grill-Spector, Sayres, and Ress 2006) offer promising avenues for sub-dividing multi-
functional regions. However, it is unlikely that this strategy will explain away every instance of 
neural multi-functionality. First, in practice, multi-functionality often resists subdivision—e.g., 
the insular sub regions identified by Wager and Barrett (2004) still perform multiple functions. 
Second, multi-functionality is widely considered a basic feature of neural organization observed 
both in well-characterized invertebrate circuits (see Getting 1989) and at small spatial scales in 
the primate brain (see Anderson 2014, Ch. 2). Therefore, it is plausible that the human brain 
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contains genuinely multi-functional components—i.e. multi-functional populations that resist 
further subdivision. Assuming that some regions are genuinely multi-functional, how should 
brain mapping proceed? 
 
2.3.2 Cognitive ontology revision: new systematic mappings 
 
Cathy Price and Karl Friston (2005) offer an alterative strategy for analyzing multi-functional 
brain regions. They argue that brain regions perform many functions at one level of description 
and a single function at another. The basic idea is that while a region might participate in many 
different cognitive capacities—e.g., reading, mathematics, attention, etc.—each region also 
performs a single function (i.e. a characteristic computation or operation) that explains its 
recruitment across these different contexts. Neuroscientists typically describe the functions of 
brain areas using functions such as “working memory,” inherited from cognitive psychology. 
Price and Friston contend that these traditional psychological kinds cannot provide systematic 
mappings for multi-functional regions—i.e. a region will always be multi-functional when 
described in terms of familiar psychological processes. Instead, neuroscientists need to revise 
their cognitive ontologies—i.e. develop new taxonomies of cognitive functions—to obtain 
systematic functional mappings. In other words, each region has many context-sensitive 
functions and one context-invariant one. Capturing these context-invariant functions—what 
Charles Rathkopf (2013) calls “intrinsic functions”—will require developing new cognitive 
kinds. 
For instance, the posterior lateral fusiform gyrus (PLF) or “visual word form area” is 
hypothesized to function in word form recognition, a stage of reading in which the visual system 
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encodes the form of written characters (Dehaene et al. 2005). However, neuroimaging studies 
implicate PLF in many non-reading tasks such as categorizing pictures as animals or artifacts, 
recognizing objects by touch, and pairing visual cues with appropriate gestures (see Price and 
Friston 2005).11 Thus “word form recognition” cannot provide a systematic mapping for PLF—
e.g., it does not predict that categorizing pictures as animals or artifacts will recruit PLF or 
explain what PLF is doing when recruited for touch-based object recognition.  
According to Price and Friston, the common denominator between PLF’s diverse 
functions is that in each case, “a [characteristic] motor response (name or action) is retrieved 
from [appropriate] sensory cues” (2005, 267). Therefore, Price and Friston argue that PLF 
performs the single function of “sensorimotor integration” in each context. Price and Friston 
stress that sensorimotor integration is a new kind of cognitive function because it is not a 
component of reading, object categorization, or tactile object recognition hypothesized in 
cognitive psychology. They hold that sensorimotor integration is more useful than traditional 
functions because it explains PLF’s recruitment in a wider range of experimental conditions. 
 Price and Friston draw a general lesson from PLF, arguing that the lack of systematic 
mappings in cognitive neuroscience stems from neuroscientists’ tendency to describe brain 
functions in familiar psychological processes instead of searching for deeper similarities outside 
the boundaries of traditional cognitive categories. They claim, then, that in addition to a region’s 
many context-sensitive mappings (e.g., PLF is for word form recognition, tactile object 
recognition, cue-action pairing), there is a systematic or context-invariant mapping (e.g., 
sensorimotor integration) capturing the region’s function in every context. The key for Price and 
                                                
11 That a region is active in some task (e.g., as measured by fMRI) is not sufficient for concluding that the region 
has some particular function. I will not worry about this complication while discussing this example.	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Friston is that neuroscientists need to revise their cognitive ontologies to obtain these systematic 
mappings. 
 
2.3.3 Context-sensitive functional mappings 
 
Colin Klein (2012) agrees that traditional cognitive functions cannot provide systematic 
mappings for multi-functional brain regions. However, Klein offers a very different take on the 
problem: neuroscientists should abandon systematic functional mappings in favor of context-
sensitive ones—i.e. brain mappings that only hold in certain contexts. According to Klein, brain 
areas are flexibly recruited for different functional brain networks. So a region’s function 
depends on what other parts of the brain are doing—i.e. on its “neural context” (see also 
McIntosh 2000). Neuroscientists must reference these “neural contexts” when mapping functions 
onto a brain region. Furthermore, Klein argues that Price and Friston’s attempt to save systematic 
mappings through cognitive ontology revision (i.e. by articulating novel, context-invariant 
functions) is bound to yield uninformative mappings. 
Klein argues that “sensorimotor integration”—Price and Friston’s proposal for a context 
invariant function of PLF—is woefully uninformative. Many brain areas, including the parietal 
reach region, frontal eye fields, medial temporal area (MT), etc. are involved in pairing sensory 
cues with particular motor responses. As Klein notes, linking specific sensory cues to appropriate 
motor responses may be “what nearly all of cortex does” (2012, 955). Thus it is trivially true that 
the function of PLF is “sensorimotor integration,” since this could describe the function of 
virtually any brain area. 
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Klein elaborates that systematic functional mappings are often less illuminating than 
context-sensitive ones. To illustrate, Klein draws an analogy between brain regions and diesel 
truck pistons. Certain diesel truck pistons perform one of two functions (F1 or F2) depending on 
the context of the system (C1 or C2). Under normal driving conditions (C1), the piston 
compresses a fuel-air mixture as it moves upwards—this springs the piston down, which powers 
the engine (F1). When the engine brake is engaged (C2), exhaust valves release the compressed 
air before it springs the piston—the engine now drags the piston, which slows the truck down 
(F2). Klein argues that while both context-sensitive functional mappings (i.e. the piston performs 
F1 in C1 and F2 in C2) are useful, the piston’s only systematic mapping is a vacuous one like, “the 
job of the piston is to either speed the truck or to slow it down” (2012, 955). 
 Klein’s general lesson is that successfully mapping functions onto a component often 
involves specifying the broader context of the system in which the component is embedded. 
Whether the piston speeds or slows the truck depends on what other parts of the system, such as 
the engine brake and exhaust valves, are doing. In this situation, researchers should not search 
for systematic functional mappings (i.e. the one function the part performs in every context), but 
instead try to identify the relevant contexts anchoring different context-sensitive mappings. Klein 
suspects that this is true for brain regions, arguing that whether a region R performs one function 
or another critically depends on the network of regions with which it interacts. That is, R 
performs F1 in C1, F2 in C2, etc. where the relevant contexts are neural contexts, or the set of 
regions with which R is co-activated.12 For instance, PLF may perform a visual word recognition 
function in one context and a tactile object recognition function in another. Klein is not alone in 
                                                
12 As Klein (2012) notes, “neural context” refers to the functional network in which a region participates. Since the 
same anatomical network can exhibit different functional connectivity patterns, “sets of regions” are just proxies for 
functional networks, which include both what regions are activated and how those regions interact with one another.	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raising this theoretical possibility, as many neuroscientists, such as Mesulam (1990) and 
McIntosh (2000), have also proposed that brain areas perform different functions in different 
contexts. Thus Klein argues that adopting context-sensitive mappings is a more promising 
strategy for brain mapping than revising one’s cognitive ontologies to obtain systematic 
functional mappings. 
 
2.4 DIFFERENT PARTS, DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 
 
We have seen three alternatives for dealing with multi-functionality. The subdivide and conquer 
strategy advocates splitting multi-functional areas into smaller, functionally specific regions. 
Price and Friston advocate revising one’s cognitive ontologies, developing new functions such as 
“sensorimotor integration,” to regain systematic structure-function mappings. Finally, Klein 
proposes abandoning systematic mappings in favor of context sensitive ones. Presuming that the 
brain contains genuinely multi-functional parts—i.e. that the subdivide and conquer strategy will 
not always work—which approach is more promising for cognitive neuroscience? 
 I defend the view that neither strategy is more promising, and that each is necessary for 
progress in brain mapping. That is, we are unlikely to find a general strategy for mapping 
functions onto multi-functional brain regions. First, I argue that facts about the mechanistic 
organization of biological systems determine the value of different functional mapping strategies 
(2.4.1). I doubt that Price and Friston or Klein would, in principle, disagree, but in practice both 
advocate a general strategy for brain mapping without examining the facts about the brain that 
determine the success or failure of their preferred strategy. Drawing on causal role theories of 
function in the philosophical literature (Cummins 1975, Craver 2001), I argue that the relevant 
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facts determining whether cognitive ontology revision or context-sensitive mapping is more 
useful concern whether the region in question performs the same basic role or operation Ф in 
different cognitive capacities ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, etc. (2.4.2-2.4.4). I claim that the brain, like other 
biological systems (e.g., organs), contains different kinds of multi-functional parts—parts with 
conserved roles perform the same role in different capacities while components with variable 
roles do not. Since different parts call for different mapping strategies, there is likely no general 
solution to the problem of multi-functionality. 
 
2.4.1 Mechanistic organization and functional mappings 
 
Facts about the mechanistic organization of biological systems (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
2000, Craver 2001)—i.e. their spatial, temporal, and constitutive organization—determine the 
value of different functional mapping strategies.13 To illustrate, consider the subdivide and 
conquer strategy. 
The human pancreas has many functions including producing both the hormone insulin 
and enzymes used in fat digestion. Physiologists have discovered that two distinct cell 
populations carry out these functions. Cells in the Islets of Langerhans perform the pancreas’ 
endocrine functions (e.g., insulin production) while acinar cells perform its exocrine functions 
(e.g., digestive enzyme production) (Fox et al. 2001, Ch. 18). The pancreas’ multi-functionality 
is partly explained by the fact that it is a composite of distinct cell types devoted to different 
                                                
13 In this essay, I construe “mechanistic organization” in a minimal sense. While Cummins-style functional 
attributions (see Cummins 1975) do not require knowing every mechanistic detail of how components perform sub-
capacities, they reflect basic organizational features such as the hierarchical structure of capacities and sub-
capacities or roles (see Craver 2001).	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functions—this is a triumph of the subdivide and conquer strategy. The human liver also has 
many functions including glycogen storage, bile secretion, and blood toxin removal. But unlike 
the pancreas, the liver is a fairly homogeneous mass of cells called “heptatocytes.” It is not the 
case that some hepatocytes are devoted to filtering the blood, while others are devoted to 
synthesizing glycogen. Instead, the same cells are capable of performing these different functions 
at different times (Fox 2001, Ch. 18). 
So the subdivide and conquer strategy is useful for mapping functions onto what we 
might call composite components—i.e. components consisting of different kinds of functional 
subcomponents. Some neuroscientists think that traditionally defined cortical areas—i.e. 
Brodmann areas—will turn out to be such composites. The history of neuroscience suggests that 
has sometimes been the case. However, there is no guarantee that the subdivide and conquer 
strategy will always succeed since not all multi-functional components are composites. Some 
parts, such as the bulk of human liver tissue, have a homogenous composition that resists 
functional subdivision. Thus the value of the subdivide and conquer strategy depends on how the 
system in question is organized. I claim that the same is true of other kinds of multi-functional 
parts. 
 
2.4.2 Roles, capacities, and kinds of multi-functional parts 
 
What facts about the brain determine whether cognitive ontology revision or context-sensitive 
mapping is the right response to neural multi-functionality? Price and Friston and Klein dispute 
whether multi-functional brain areas perform a single function at another level of description. 
Klein understands these levels in terms of abstraction, writing: “Perhaps brain regions only 
appear pluripotent because we have not specified their functions in suitably general terms. Make 
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it abstract enough, and we will find that brain regions only do one thing after all” (2012, 954). 
According to this reading, cognitive ontology revision involves describing brain functions in 
more general terms until multi-functional areas become uni-functional. Just as walking and 
flying are both examples of “locomotion,” word form recognition and clapping in response to a 
visual cue are both examples of  “sensorimotor integration.” Klein worries that such mappings 
achieve generality only at the expense of specificity and explanatory power. Saying that the 
function of PLF is “sensorimotor integration” is like saying that the hypothalamus’ function is 
“keeping people alive”—it covers everything, but explains very little. 
I am sympathetic to Klein’s worry—abstract functional mappings do risk gaining 
generality at a loss of explanatory power, and “sensorimotor integration” is a prime example of 
this concern. Neuroscientists should not simply describe cognitive functions more abstractly until 
multi-functionality goes away. That said, pace Klein, the relevant levels of functional description 
for Price and Friston (and for the debate at large) are not levels of abstraction at all, but instead 
levels in a mechanistic hierarchy (Craver 2001). Causal role approaches to function distinguish 
between two levels of description for a component X: the broader capacity ψ to which a 
component contributes and the role Ф that X plays in that capacity. For example, the valves (X1) 
in human veins contribute to circulation (ψ) by preventing the backflow of blood (Фa), while the 
heart (X2) contributes to circulation by pumping (Фb). Biological components are often 
embedded in a functional hierarchy in which their immediate workings have broader functional 
consequences. Picture a gene G, which encodes some protein P. If P is involved in the 
inflammatory immune response R, then we might rightly say that the function of G is to encode 
P (at the level of roles), or that G is involved in response R (at the level of capacities). Talking 
about “levels” in terms of abstraction glosses over this distinction, and threatens to make the 
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debate about brain functions merely a verbal dispute. In contrast, multi-functionality raises 
interesting questions about levels of functional organization in the brain. 
Return to the case of PLF, a brain region putatively involved in reading, tactile object 
recognition, and performing gestures in response to cues. According to Klein’s reading, 
“sensorimotor integration,” is just a more abstract description of these functions. In fact, 
“sensorimotor description” is not an abstract description at all, but a (perhaps unfortunate) name 
for a common role Ф that PLF performs in each capacity. The claim is that PLF performs some 
basic operation—i.e. a computation or local working—that that is recruited for both reading and 
touch.14 This is not a question about how abstractly to describe functions, but of whether PLF 
does the same thing—i.e. performs the same internal operation—when recruited for reading and 
cue-action responses. Many biological components are multi-functional in the sense that the 
same structure is recruited for different capacities ψs. For instance, the brainstem is involved in 
both breathing (ψ1) and blood pressure regulation (ψ2). Whenever a part is recruited for different 
capacities, the question arises whether it performs the same role Ф in each capacity (Figure 2.4). 
By “role,” I mean the internal operation that a part performs. In what follows, I argue that 
biological components, including brain areas, differ in precisely this respect—i.e. parts with 
conserved roles perform the same basic operation in different capacities while parts with 
variable roles do not. Then I illustrate how these facts about brain organization bear on the value 
of cognitive ontology revision versus context-sensitive mapping. 
 
 
 
                                                
14 See Bergeron (2007) and Anderson (2010) for similar distinctions.	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Figure 2.4: Roles versus capacities in brain mapping. The same brain region (R) can be recruited 
for functional networks for different capacities. For example, network {W, X, R, Y, Z} is 
associated with ψ1 while network  {A, B, R, D, E} is associated with ψ2. Region R is recruited 
for both networks, the question is: does it perform the same role Ф in each capacity? 
 
 
2.4.3 Conserved roles and systematic mappings  
 
Some biological components have conserved roles—i.e. they perform the same basic role or 
operation Ф in different capacities ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, etc.15 Consider the example of central pattern 
generators in systems neuroscience (Getting 1989, Briggman and Kristan 2008). In some species 
of leech, a single pool of motor neurons function as a central pattern generator that controls the 
                                                
15 I do not mean “conserved” in an evolutionary sense.	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rhythm (Ф) of swimming (ψ1) and crawling (ψ2) motions (Briggman and Kristan 2008). 
Neurophysiological evidence suggests that while swimming and crawling rely on distinct muscle 
groups in the leech body, in both cases the pattern generator determines the rate and rhythm of 
the motion. But note that “rhythm control” is not a more abstract description of crawling and 
swimming—instead it denotes the common role that the central pattern generator plays in each 
capacity. Conserved role multi-functionality is found in other biological systems. Some genes 
exhibit “parsimonious pleiotropy,” a pattern in which “one gene is used for identical chemical 
purposes in multiple pathways” (Hodgkin 1998, 502).16 In E. coli bacteria, a gene called ilvN 
encodes an enzyme (AHAS1) that is used in different pathways to synthesize either the amino 
acid valine, or the amino acid isoleucine (Dailey and Cronan 1986). In this case, a gene “does the 
same thing” for two different biosynthetic pathways. Thus many biological components perform 
the same basic operation in different capacities. 
What makes a role “conserved” across different capacities will vary from system to 
system. In a computational setting, a string of code might execute the same subroutine (Ф) in 
different programs (ψ1, ψ2, etc.). Klein (2012) mentions, for example, that a computational 
subroutine that performs fast Fourier transforms can be deployed for either an image 
compression program or an audio program. In a cell, an enzyme might catalyze (Ф) a reaction 
shared by different metabolic pathways (ψ1, ψ2, etc.). Not all role attributions are particularly 
useful. A brain region R might perform the same role of “secreting neurotransmitters” in 
different cognitive capacities, but this functional characterization is not very informative. 
Attributing a conserved role to some component X will involve demonstrating that the 
component performs a sub-capacity (Ф) does explanatory work in analyzing a target capacity 
                                                
16	  Pleiotropy occurs when one gene affects multiple phenotypes.	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(ψ1), and then demonstrating that this same role (Ф) does explanatory work in analyzing a 
another capacity (ψ2) with which the component is associated. For example, once we understand 
that the leech central pattern generator controls the pace and rhythm of different motions, we can 
predict that certain interventions on the pattern generator, such as a pharmacological blocker, 
will slow the rhythm of both crawling and swimming. The norms governing informative role 
attributions (as opposed to trivial or gerrymandered ones) will vary in different scientific fields.17  
Components with conserved roles permit systematic mappings of the kind Price and 
Friston envision—that is, at the level of roles, the component does perform just one function. 
This formulation holds that brain areas typically perform the same basic role or operation Ф in 
different cognitive capacities ψ1, ψ2, etc. Other authors have proposed similar theories about 
multi-functional regions. For example, Anderson (2010, see also Bergeron 2007) distinguishes 
between the diverse higher cognitive functions for which regions are recruited (e.g., reading) and 
the re-deployed “workings” or computations the regions perform. Do brain areas typically 
perform the same role in different cognitive capacities? 
Recent work suggests that the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a region implicated in numeric 
cognition in humans and other mammals (e.g., rats and monkeys) performs the same basic 
operation in judgments of number and time. In humans, neuroimaging results suggest that IPS is 
recruited for judgments of quantity (e.g., does pile A or pile B contain more dots?) duration (e.g., 
did tone A or tone B sound for longer?), and size. A leading theory of these effects is that IPS 
implements a common mechanism for representing analog magnitude (Ф) that is flexibly 
                                                
17 Some philosophers (e.g., Neander 1991) worry that role individuation in causal role accounts is hopelessly 
unconstrained, hence rendering the approach trivial. Following Amundson and Lauder (1994), I hold that scientific 
practice provides principled grounds for role individuation in particular domains of inquiry. But I will not defend the 
point in detail here. 
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recruited for visual estimations of quantity (ψ1) and auditory estimations of duration (ψ2) (Pinel 
et al. 2004, Bueti and Walsh 2009).  
Many other brain regions are hypothesized to perform the same role in different cognitive 
capacities. For example, human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is thought to implement a selection 
mechanism (Ф)—i.e. a mechanism for choosing which stimuli will be rehearsed—for two 
distinct working memory networks: the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop (ψ2) 
(Baddely 2003). Aminoff, Kverga, and Bar (2013) argue that the parahippocampal cortex (PHC) 
plays the same basic role in several different cognitive capacities. The PHC is involved in many 
functions including spatial memory, visual scene processing, and even non-spatial forms of 
episodic memory (e.g., odor-odor associations in the rat). Aminoff and colleagues propose that 
PHC performs a form of contextual processing (Ф)—i.e. accessing associative links in long-term 
memory—for different capacities such as scene processing (ψ1) and non-spatial episodic memory 
(ψ2). Thus conserved role multi-functionality is found in many biological systems and is 
hypothesized to exist in the human brain. Where these roles have not been discovered, 
characterizing them may call for developing new kinds of cognitive functions. Just as IPS 
appears to make the same contribution—i.e. analog magnitude representation—to duration and 
quantity judgments, other multi-functional areas—e.g., PLF—may have conserved roles that we 
have not yet characterized. 
 
2.4.4 Variable roles and context-sensitive mappings  
 
As we have seen, some biological systems have parts that play the same basic role in different 
capacities. Discovering these roles may produce informative, systematic mappings of the kind 
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Price and Friston envision. But just as the subdivide and conquer strategy will sometimes fail 
because not all multi-functional parts are composites, cognitive ontology revision may fail if 
there are components without conserved roles. Do brain regions perform the same operation, 
regardless of what psychological capacity they are recruited for? Should the goal of cognitive 
neuroscience be to discover each area’s context-invariant function? 
If Klein’s analysis of diesel truck pistons is right, then some components exhibit context-
sensitivity at both the level of roles Ф and capacities ψs. Under normal conditions (C1), the 
piston speeds the truck up (ψ1) by compressing a fuel-air mixture (Ф); when the engine brake is 
engaged (C2), the piston slows the truck (ψ2) by acting as a weight that the engine drags (Ф). 
Klein’s analysis here points to an interesting feature of biological organization: parts can be 
multi-functional at different levels in a functional hierarchy. Some multi-functional components 
have variable roles—i.e. they perform different roles or operations Фa, Фb, Фc, etc. in different 
capacities ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, etc. 
Variable role multi-functionality is found in many biological systems. Some regulatory 
genes can enhance or repress transcription depending on their biochemical context (Hodgkin 
1998). For example, the gene Ultrabithorax modulates leg segment growth in some aquatic 
insects (e.g., water striders). However, due to differential regulatory effects, Ultrabithorax 
expression shortens some developing leg segments while lengthening other developing segments 
(Khila, Abouheif, and Rowe 2014). Similarly, liver hepatocytes perform different roles in 
different capacities. When the pancreas produces insulin, hepatocytes absorb (Фa) glucose from 
the bloodstream for glycogen synthesis, which lowers blood sugar (ψ1). At other times, 
heptatocytes secrete bile (Фb), which contributes to fat digestion (ψ2). Thus some components 
contribute to different capacities in virtue of different operational capabilities. 
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Components with variable roles often lack systematic mappings. Liver cells do not “do 
the same thing” when they contribute to fat digestion and blood sugar regulation, except in a 
very general or abstract sense (i.e. metabolism). Context-sensitive mappings are often more 
useful for such parts. This interpretation holds that brain areas typically (or at least enough to 
trouble the cognitive ontology revision approach) perform different roles Фa, Фb, etc. in different 
cognitive capacities ψ1, ψ2, etc. Is there evidence of variable role multi-functionality in the brain? 
 Recent work in cognitive neuroscience suggests that the same neural populations can 
implement different coding schemes for different channels of environmental information. The 
hippocampus is involved in both spatial navigation (ψ1) and episodic memory (ψ2). Leutgeub and 
colleagues (2005) argue that a single population of hippocampal neurons (found in CA1-CA3) 
has distinct signaling patterns for these capacities. According to their model, what subset of the 
population is firing (Фa) signifies the rat’s spatial location (ψ1); these “place field configurations” 
correspond to location, but not environmental features (e.g., colors, shapes, etc.). At the same 
time, the population’s rate function (Фb) reflects the presence of certain environmental features 
(ψ2) regardless of the active place configuration. Therefore, these neurons implement population 
coding for spatial memory and rate coding for episodic memory.   
 Other regions are thought to perform different roles in different cognitive capacities—
e.g., while the dorsal striatum is involved in reward learning (ψ1) and voluntary movement (ψ2), 
models of its contribution to these capacities involve distinct operations. The dorsal striatum’s 
role in reward learning involves temporal difference detection (Фa)—i.e. detecting differences 
between anticipated and actual reward onset—while its role in initiating movements is modeled 
as a simple disinhibition or gating mechanism (Фb) (Suri and Schultz 2001, Liljeholm and 
O’Doherty 2012). Likewise, primate neurophysiology studies suggest that certain inferotemporal 
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cortex (IT) neurons exhibit one spiking pattern (Фa) for detecting global features of objects (ψ1) 
and another spiking pattern (Фb) corresponding to local features (ψ2) of the same stimuli (Wang, 
Tanifuji, and Tanaka 1998). These results suggest that some brain areas perform different roles 
in different cognitive capacities. Unlike regions such as the PHC or IPS that seem to perform a 
common operation in each capacity, these areas are multi-functional at multiple levels of 
description. Thus there is no guarantee that cognitive ontology revision, construed as the search 
for systematic mappings at the level of roles, will succeed. 
 
2.5 THE FUNCTIONAL HETEROGENEITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
There is no canonical structure-function relationship for multi-functional components in biology. 
Given recent research in cognitive neuroscience, this appears to be equally true of genes, organs, 
and neural systems. This suggests a “Functional Heterogeneity Hypothesis,” which holds that the 
brain contains different kinds of multi-functional parts.  According to this hypothesis, the brain 
exhibits a heterogeneous functional organization in which different regions are multi-functional 
in different ways. 
The value of different mapping strategies in biology is inextricably tied to the 
mechanistic organization of the target system (see Figure 2.5). For instance, composite 
components (e.g., the pancreas) are amenable to the subdivide and conquer strategy while other 
multi-functional components are not. The Functional Heterogeneity Hypothesis predicts that 
there will be no general account of how brain mapping will proceed in light of multi-
functionality. Where regions have conserved roles, characterizing these roles (e.g., analog 
magnitude representation or contextual processing) may yield novel systematic mappings 
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reflecting interesting similarities between seemingly disparate cognitive capacities. However, 
there is no guarantee that this strategy will work. To the extent that brain regions have variable 
roles (e.g., implementing different coding schemes for different stimuli), context-sensitive 
mappings will often prove more useful. Which strategy is preferable will depend on the target 
brain region. 
 
 
Type of component Mapping Strategy Examples 
Composite  Subdivide and Conquer Pancreatic tissue, Insula 
Conserved Role Multi-
Functional 
Systematic Mapping 
(via functional revision) 
Leech Central Pattern 
Generator, Intraparietal 
Sulcus 
Variable Role Multi-
Functional 
Context-Sensitive Mapping Liver tissue, Hippocampus, 
Ultrabithorax 
 
Figure 2.5: The Functional Heterogeneity Hypothesis. Different mapping strategies are useful 
for mapping functions onto different kinds of multi-functional components. 
 
 
If my account is right, then the challenge for neuroscientists is not to provide a general strategy 
for mapping functions onto multi-functional regions, but strategies that work for particular kinds 
of areas and ways of identifying what kinds of areas there are. Depending on factors such as the 
size of the region in question, one’s existing taxonomy of cognitive functions, and the 
mechanistic organization in of brain systems, progress in brain mapping might require cognitive 
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ontology revision, new methods of subdividing regions, or context-sensitive mapping. The trick 
is determining when each approach is needed. 
 39 
3.0 COGNITIVE ONTOLOGY REVISION AND fMRI: TWO STRATEGIES 
3.1 CHAPTER 3 INTRODUCTION 
 
Psychologists typically study human cognition indirectly by positing the existence of 
hypothetical mental faculties or psychological constructs.18 Following Price and Friston (2005), I 
will refer to the taxonomy or set of psychological constructs taken to be legitimate components 
of the mind as a “cognitive ontology.” Sigmund Freud’s (1859-1939) cognitive ontology 
included the id, ego, and superego. Franz Gall’s (1758-1828) cognitive ontology included a 
faculty of language, mechanical skill, poetic talent, and metaphysical perspicuity. Cognitive 
ontologies today include functional components such as spatial cognition, theory of mind, 
episodic memory, and so forth (Poldrack 2010).19 
Historically, there has been a great deal of controversy about: (1) What the right cognitive 
ontology is (2) How scientists can determine what the right cognitive ontology is—viz., what set 
of experimental, inferential, and statistical methods provide evidence about our cognitive 
                                                
18 As I discussed in Chapter 2, these construct labels—e.g., “working memory,” “top-down attention,” etc. can often 
be thought of as verbal proxies for particular mechanistically or computationally defined capacities. 
19 This use of the term “ontology” here derives from informatics, where it designates a taxonomy of relationships 
between concepts or kind terms, rather than from philosophy (see Price and Friston 2005).	  
 40 
ontologies.20 Note that “cognitive ontologies” is just a fancy way of talking about the taxonomy 
of psychological kinds; debates about cognitive ontologies are essentially debates about what 
philosophers would call the “natural kinds” of cognitive psychology (see Khalidi 2013, Polger 
and Shapiro 2016). In contemporary terms, there is disagreement about both the validity of 
particular psychological constructs or kind terms such as “anger” or “response inhibition” 
(Lenartowicz et al. 2010, Lindquist et al. 2012) and about the methods used to validate 
psychological constructs. 
Recently, a number of prominent cognitive neuroscientists have argued that fMRI studies 
necessitate cognitive ontology revision (Price and Friston 2005, Poldrack 2010, Lenartowicz et 
al. 2010, Anderson 2014 Ch. 4, 2015). The basic idea is that neuroimaging findings should 
compel psychologists to revise their psychological kinds. In other words, fMRI bears on the 
validity of psychological constructs such as working memory or disgust. For example, Lindquist 
and colleagues (2012) argue that fMRI findings pose a significant problem for basic emotion 
theory, which divides emotions into discrete categories such as anger, happiness, sadness, 
surprise, and disgust. Similarly, Lenartowicz and colleagues (2010) argue that fMRI results 
validate some cognitive control constructs and cast doubts on others. 
A couple notes about cognitive ontology revision are in order. First, the debate is not just 
about verbal labels such as “anger” or “working memory,” but about the mechanistic 
specifications of such labels (i.e. about how to individuate cognitive processes). For example, 
some neuroscientists hold that “response inhibition, “which involves suppressing a prepotent 
response,” is a different process than “task-switching,” which occurs when participants move 
                                                
20 Of course, this way of formulating the problem presumes that there is a single, correct taxonomy of psychological 
kinds. As Danks (2015), and others, have argued, pragmatic considerations might necessitate carving up our 
scientific ontologies differently for different purposes.	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from one template to another. By contrast, Lenartowicz et al. (2010) use fMRI to claim that these 
verbal labels may denote the same brain process. Second, the taxonomy of psychology does not 
consist only of numerically distinct cognitive processes. For example, psychologists talk about 
“memory” as a set of cognitive processes including (at the very least) declarative memory, 
working memory, episodic memory, recognition memory, procedural memory, etc. Thus some of 
the kind terms in psychology refer not to distinguishable cognitive processes, but to conceptually 
useful categories for grouping these processes—e.g., kinds like “memory,” “perception,” or 
“cognitive control,” each of which consist of many different cognitive processes. For the sake of 
this chapter, I will refer to distinguishable cognitive processes as the “constructs” of one’s 
cognitive ontology. 
In its most extreme form, harkening back to the Churchlandian idea that psychological 
categories will be eliminated as neuroscience progresses (Churchland 1981), researchers 
envision a scenario where neuroimaging spurs a revolution in conceptualizing psychological 
kinds (Anderson 2015). In its modest form, researchers consider fMRI a fruitful source of appeal 
for competing cognitive theories (Chatham and Badre 2015). If fMRI can be used to assess 
construct validity in psychology, this has profound philosophical implications. If fMRI can be 
used to assess construct validity in psychology, this has profound philosophical implications. For 
one, theories pitched at the so-called “psychological” level would not be immune to findings 
about neural implementation, as some theorists have suggested (Fodor 1999, Coltheart 2004, 
2006).21 Second, this would reflect a major methodological shift in cognitive science in which a 
new form of brain data could contribute to the development and assessment of psychological 
constructs.  
                                                
21 Of course, even if fMRI cannot assess psychological construct validity, other forms of neuroscientific evidence 
may prove useful for evaluating psychological constructs.	  
 42 
In this chapter, I investigate whether fMRI is a legitimate tool for assessing the validity of 
psychological constructs. I examine two strategies for cognitive ontology revision. The first 
strategy (Greene et al. 2001, Lindquist et al. 2012) tests one’s cognitive ontology by assuming a 
perspicuous mapping between psychological constructs, on one hand, and parts of the brain on 
another—e.g., that unique psychological functions are carried out by unique parts of the brain. In 
this strategy, neuroimagers implicitly or explicitly use bridging assumptions (see Roskies 2009, 
Coltheart 2013, Nathan and Del Pinal 2016 for a discussion) specifying how cognitive functions 
map onto neural structures to test the validity of psychological constructs.22 The problem with 
this approach is that the bridging assumptions that neuroscientists use to link fMRI data to 
cognitive theories are often implausible and overly strong. The second strategy uses pattern 
classifier techniques such as multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to draw inferences about 
whether tasks recruit similar or distinct cognitive processes (e.g., Lenartowicz et al. 2010). While 
this strategy typically relies on weaker bridging assumptions about structure-function mapping, it 
involves problematic methodological assumptions about what neuroscientists can infer from 
classifier performance. I conclude that fMRI studies provide very weak evidence about the 
validity of psychological constructs, even if it is useful for other purposes (e.g., testing the 
relationship between constructs). 
 Here is how I will proceed. First, I clarify some of the main conceptual issues 
surrounding cognitive ontology revision (3.2). Here, I place cognitive ontology revision in the 
context of construct validation and show some of the different ways that cognitive ontology 
revision might proceed. Second, I discuss the case for fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision, 
                                                
22 Nathan and Del Pinal (2016) use the term “bridge laws” in their essay. I prefer “bridging assumptions,” since 
neuroscientists do not take the generalizations linking cognitive processing to fMRI findings to be necessary, 
universally true, etc. I think these bridging statements operate more like heuristics or assumptions guiding research 
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993).	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highlighting different ways that neuroscientists have used fMRI to draw inferences about 
psychological kinds. Here I highlight that fMRI results can, in principle, bear on construct 
validity, but their ability to do so depends on auxiliary hypotheses or bridging assumptions about 
the brain (3.3). Then, I argue that the bridging assumptions that neuroimagers use to test 
cognitive ontologies are problematic given recent findings in human brain mapping (3.4). 
Finally, I introduce and critique pattern classification as a means of resolving some of these 
issues (3.5). I conclude with some remarks on the use of fMRI for cognitive ontology revision 
(3.6). 
 
3.2 COGNITIVE ONTOLOGY REVISION 
 
Psychologists typically study cognition indirectly through operationalized measures. For 
example, the Stroop Task is taken to recruit cognitive control (Sabb et al. 2008). The general 
problem of construct validity concerns how researchers can make correct inferences from 
operationalized measures to the nature of the constructs—i.e. unobservable mental processes or 
entities—taken to underlie those measures (Cronbach and Meehl 1955, Cambell and Fiske 1959, 
Smith 2005). A psychologist might want to know if the Stroop Task recruits the same cognitive 
control process(es) as the Go/NoGo Task. Psychologists assess construct validity using a variety 
of methods for comparing operationalized measures to theoretical predictions about the 
relationship between constructs. For instance, establishing convergent validity involves 
demonstrating that two independent measures of one putative construct (e.g., two different 
cognitive control tasks) are related to one another while establishing discriminant validity 
involves showing that independent measures associated with putatively different constructs (e.g., 
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a cognitive control task versus a memory task) are unrelated (Campbell and Fiske 1959, 
Campbell 1960). 
I will not delve deeply into the statistical issues surrounding construct validation. Instead, 
I am pointing out that the debate about cognitive ontology revision is essentially a debate about 
how experimentally observed, task-related changes in the BOLD signal (i.e. what fMRI 
measures) relate to unobservable psychological kinds or constructs (again looking at instances 
where these constructs refer to distinct psychological processes rather than “higher level” 
taxonomic groupings such as “emotion” or “perception”). In a broad sense, the project of brain-
based cognitive ontology revision requires that there is some way to relate the neural events 
measured by the BOLD signal to taxonomies of cognitive kinds. Bracketing the issue of 
neuroscience for the moment, most psychologists—even behaviorists, insofar as learning rules 
are psychological kinds—implicitly or explicitly endorse some particular “cognitive ontology,” 
or set of psychological constructs taken to be valid psychological kinds.23 There is often 
significant disagreement about how to carve the mind at its functional joints; for example, basic 
emotion theorists (e.g., Ekman 1999) hold that “anger” is a valid psychological construct, while 
social constructionists (e.g., Lindquist et al. 2012) do not. For example, emotional constructivists 
hold that different instances of what we call colloquially call “anger” do not involve the same set 
of “psychological ingredients” (see Lindquist et al. 2012). These disputes are about what 
members to include in one’s cognitive ontology often lead psychologists to revise their 
taxonomies of psychological kinds.  
                                                
23 It is possible that some psychologists adopt an anti-realist stance toward cognitive constructs such as “attention” 
or “working memory.” Another complexity is that there is likely substantial taxonomic variation between individual 
psychologists and different psychological research traditions.  
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There are many ways in which cognitive ontology revision can proceed. In divergence or 
kind splitting psychologists adjust their ontologies so that one kind—e.g., “memory”—is split 
into two—e.g., procedural and declarative memory (Craver 2004, Polger and Shapiro 2016). In 
convergence or lumping, psychologists revise their ontologies so that different kinds are lumped 
together. For instance, Gauthier and Tarr (2000) argue that “face recognition” is not a distinct 
psychological capacity, but one manifestation of a more general capacity for visual expertise (i.e. 
discriminating between different exemplars of a visual category).24 Other times, psychologists 
revise their ontologies through discovery—i.e. adding new cognitive kinds. For example, 
Baddeley (2000) added a component called the “episodic buffer” to an initial model of working 
memory (Baddeley and Hitch 1974) in order to account for incongruous findings such as the 
phonological similarity and word length effects. Finally, some psychological kinds, such as 
Gall’s “metaphysical perspicuity” or Freud’s “death impulse” are eliminated after further 
research.25  
Thus cognitive ontology revision occurs when psychologists revise their taxonomies by 
lumping and splitting cognitive kinds, by adding new members via discovery, or by eliminating 
existing kinds.26 Now, I need to make a couple of quick remarks about the previous discussion of 
cognitive ontology revision in Chapter 2. First, reassessing the functions of brain areas—e.g., 
that the superior temporal sulcus detects social situations rather than “biological motion” 
                                                
24	  Another way to interpret Gauthier and Tarr’s (2000) claim is that face recognition (after learning) is a distinct 
psychological capacity from other categories, but one that relies on a general learning system.	  
25 Paul Thagard (1990, 2012) adopts a similar framework outlining the ways in which conceptual change occurs in 
science.	  
26	  This is an overly simplistic picture, as there is room for reconceptualizing cognitive kinds (e.g., achieving a 
different understanding of what “working memory” is) without wholesale changes to one’s cognitive ontology.	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(Pelphrey et al. 2004)—need not always amount to cognitive ontology revision.27 Establishing 
whether the right temporoparietal junction is involved in top-down attention or theory of mind 
would not (for most researchers) result in cognitive ontology revision, since these are standard 
members of most cognitive ontologies. The claim that Price and Friston (2005), Anderson (2014, 
2015) and others are making is that in some cases, reconceptualizing the functions of brain areas 
(particularly in ways that afford a mechanistic or computational understanding of how those 
regions operate) can lead to the discovery of new cognitive kinds. This is a special case of using 
fMRI to test one’s cognitive ontologies; as we will see in the following section, there are other 
ways in which fMRI might contribute to cognitive ontology revision. Second, cognitive ontology 
revision need not involve brain data at all, since behavioral studies alone often support the 
revision of psychological kinds (Baddeley 2000). 
In addition to debates about the validity of particular psychological constructs, there are 
issues surrounding the methods (broadly construed to include different instruments, experimental 
protocols, and different inferential or statistical interpretations of said results) used to validate 
and invalidate psychological kinds. Meehl (1978) portrays construct validation as a dynamic 
process in which psychologists articulate relationships between theoretical constructs, 
operationalize these constructs using various measures, compare predictions about these 
measures using different statistical techniques, and revise their taxonomies accordingly. Some 
debates about the methods used to validate or invalidate psychological constructs are debates 
about the relevance of particular instruments (and the dependent variables they measure) for 
assessing construct validity. Researchers have questioned, for example, whether the BOLD 
signal is really a good proxy of task-related neural activity. If the BOLD signal doesn’t reflect 
                                                
27	  I am not endorsing this interpretation of the superior temporal sulcus; I am just using it as a proposed example of 
functional revision. 
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neural activity, then presumably BOLD changes cannot bear on cognitive ontologies even if 
psychological processes are type-identical to neural ones (e.g., Logothetis 2008).  
Other debates concern the logic of the experiments in question—viz., on the statistical 
and inductive inferences permitted by the findings. Here the question is not whether some 
dependent variable relates to hypothetical constructs at all (i.e. it is not a matter of relevance tout 
court), but instead about the way in measures of that variable relate to psychological construct 
validity. An example is the debate about whether double dissociations in neuropsychology—i.e. 
instances where process A can experience deficits without deficits in process B and vice versa—
actually reveal the existence of distinct cognitive components or processing elements (e.g., Plaut 
1995, Patterson and Plaut 2009). While some researchers hold double dissociations as the gold 
standard for individuating cognitive processes (e.g., Shallice 1988), others (e.g., Plaut and 
Patterson 2009) argue that apparent double dissociations can in fact arise from lesioning a single 
cognitive system, and are therefore not strong evidence for the existence of multiple systems or 
cognitive components. The worry here is not that dissociations are unrelated to cognitive 
architecture, but that one cannot read architecture directly from dissociability. Finally, there are 
questions about the statistical techniques used to compare operationalize measures.  
Historically, psychologists have often developed new experimental methods for studying 
mental processes. For example, Vigouroux (1879) introduced the galvanic skin response as a 
means of measuring emotional distress. These techniques introduce new dependent variables 
(e.g., reaction times, galvanic skin responses, BOLD responses) into psychology. At the same 
time, they raise questions about the relevance (Does infant gaze time have anything to do with 
their “expectations” about the world?) and inferential validity (Do double dissociations reveal the 
existence of distinct cognitive components?) of psychological experiments employing these 
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techniques. The question about fMRI and cognitive ontologies, then, is whether experiments that 
use the BOLD signal as a dependent variable bear on psychological construct validity. 
 
3.3 fMRI AND THE CASE FOR REVISION 
 
3.3.1 The call for revision 
 
Many prominent neuroscientists argue that fMRI necessitates cognitive ontology revision. In 
addition to those who think that neuroimaging studies can be used to discover novel 
psychological constructs (Price and Friston 2005, Anderson 2010, 2014), there are 
neuroscientists who believe that fMRI studies can motivate the lumping (e.g., De Brigard et al. 
2013), splitting (Lenartowicz et al. 2010, Woo et al. 2014), or elimination (e.g., Greene and 
Haidt 2002, Lindquist et al. 2012) of psychological kinds. This movement has precursors in 
philosophical arguments that psychological and/or folk psychological kinds will be radically 
revised—e.g., reduced (Bickle 1995) or eliminated (Churchland 1981)—as brain research 
progresses. The core claim is that neuroimaging studies, like behavioral or neuropsychological 
studies, bears on the validity of psychological constructs. The question is: Can fMRI research 
play this role in the development and assessment of cognitive theories? 
Let me put my cards on the table before forging ahead. Some philosophers and cognitive 
scientists are wholesale skeptics concerning the very relevance of fMRI for cognitive theorizing. 
Fodor (1999) and Coltheart (2004, 2006) argue that fMRI only reveals where cognitive 
processing takes place without saying anything about how it takes place. Furthermore, since 
cognitive theories do not make predictions about patterns of brain activation, brain activation 
 49 
patterns (whether measured through fMRI, EEG, or other technologies), cannot contradict 
cognitive theories, and therefore cannot be used to assess them. I think these arguments are 
mistaken.28 As many theorists have recently argued, cognitive theories do make predictions 
about patterns of brain given a set of auxiliary assumptions (Roskies 2009), neural 
embellishments (Coltheart 2013) or associative bridge laws (Nathan and Del Pinal 2016) 
specifying how brain activity relates to cognitive processing. These assumptions, which add 
content not specified in, say a strictly mathematical or computational description of a 
psychological task, permit inferences from brain activation patterns to psychological theories. 
For example, let’s suppose that neuroscientists can establish that brain pattern P in the auditory 
cortex reflects the presence of inner speech (this is a specific brain mapping). In this case, 
researchers can provide inductive support that a new task—e.g., solving a math problem—
involves inner speech based on whether that task elicits pattern P. 
As we will see, this means that the value of fMRI for assessing the validity of 
psychological constructs depends on the plausibility of the relevant bridging assumptions. One 
consequence of this is that there is no a priori reason why fMRI data cannot bear on the validity 
of psychological constructs. On the other hand, one should not take for granted that 
neuroimaging data will be useful for assessing construct validity given this reliance on often 
untested bridging assumptions. For example, if it turns out that the brain exhibits massive 
degeneracy (Price and Friston 2002)—i.e. if many different regions perform the same function in 
different contexts—activation in two brain areas wouldn’t reflect the recruitment of distinct 
cognitive processes. My goal is to clarify what it would take for fMRI studies to necessitate 
cognitive ontology revision and to determine whether fMRI studies currently provide strong 
                                                
28 I am also not convinced that general arguments for the autonomy of psychology as a special science guarantee 
that brain data could not compel a revision of cognitive kinds, but I will not press the issue here.	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evidence in favor of lumping, splitting, or eliminating cognitive kinds. This requires critiquing 
extant evidence for fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision. A couple methodological notes are 
in order. First, many of the inferences I identify below are more general than the specific 
mapping above. My claim is not that, in principle, one cannot provide inductive support for a 
brain mapping that will lend itself to using fMRI to test some cognitive theory. Instead, my claim 
is that many prominent studies calling for cognitive ontology revision rely on general bridging 
assumptions that are at best untested and at worst likely false. 
 
3.3.2 Evidence for revision  
 
Arguments for fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision generally take the following form: (1) 
There is a mismatch between BOLD data and what our psychological taxonomies, plus some 
assumptions about how cognitive functions map onto the brain, would predict, (2) It is more 
likely that our psychological theories are impoverished than that our assumptions about the brain 
are mistaken, (3) Therefore, we should revise our cognitive ontology to eliminate the mismatch. 
As I demonstrate below, (2) often involves assumptions about how cognitive functions generally 
map onto the brain, plus the implicit belief that these bridging assumptions are more secure than 
one’s cognitive ontology. In other words, researchers frequently assume a general picture of how 
cognitive functions map onto neural structure, and use this general picture to motivate revision. 
Here is a brief summary of recent studies advocating cognitive ontology revision on the basis of 
fMRI data. 
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Neural Overlap and Kind Lumping 
Some neuroscientists argue that neural overlap between regions supporting distinct 
cognitive functions provides evidence in favor of lumping those functions together. De Brigard 
and colleagues (2013) for example, argue that the same network of brain regions is recruited for 
episodic memory (thinking about one’s past experiences) and other functions such as future 
thinking and counterfactual thinking about the self. They claim that this network implements a 
generally mechanism for self-projection and speculate that memory is perhaps not a separate 
capacity from counterfactual thinking about personal episodes. Lenartowicz and colleagues 
(2010) argue that a pattern classifier fails to distinguish brain scans of participants engaged in 
cognitive control processes such as “task-switching” versus “response inhibition;” thus it is 
likely that these are different verbal labels for the same cognitive control construct. Finally, 
Eisenberger, Lieberman and Williams (2003) argue that social exclusion (e.g., looking at a 
photograph of a lover who rejected you) recruits many of the regions involved in somatic pain, 
thus social rejection involves the experience of physical pain (see also MacDonald and Leary 
2005).  
 
Neural Dissociations and Kind Splitting  
Other neuroscientists argue for splitting psychological kinds on the basis of dissociations 
in patterns of brain activity. Contrary to Eisenberger, Lieberman and Williams (2003), Woo et al. 
(2014) report that, despite some regional overlap between pain and social rejection, a pattern 
classifier can robustly discriminate neural signals related to pain and social rejection. They 
conclude that social rejection does not recruit the same brain circuits as somatic pain, and is 
therefore not literally a form of pain. Epstein (2008) proposes that that visual navigation consists 
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of both the construction of visual scenes as landmarks and a mechanism that places those scenes 
in a map-like representation of the environment. Epstein argues for these components based on a 
neural dissociation between the parahippocampal place area (PPA), which is involved in scene 
construction, and retrosplenial cortex (RSC), which is involved situating local scenes in an 
environmental context. Henson et al. (1999) tested a dual-process theory of recognition memory 
using fMRI. They compared items in a recognition task that participants reported 
“remembering,” (recollection) versus “just knowing” (familiarity). They found that a portion of 
anterior cingulate cortex was more active for recollection, while a region in right lateral frontal 
cortex was more active for familiarity. They conclude that recognition memory consists of at 
least two different processes. 
 
Regional Selectivity and Elimination 
Some neuroscientists draw inferences from regional specialization—i.e. whether or not 
some brain area is dedicated to a particular task or domain—to cognitive specialization. 
Lindquist and colleagues (2012) argue that while basic emotion theory predicts that each 
emotion construct—anger, disgust, etc.—should be associated with a neural substrate specialized 
for that emotion category, each limbic region is in fact recruited for many different emotion 
categories. They conclude that the brain does not respect basic emotion theory (it does not 
exhibit systems dedicated to discrete basic emotion categories), and therefore basic emotions 
such as “sadness” are not valid psychological constructs. Similarly, Greene and Haidt (2002) 
argue that the brain areas recruited for moral judgments are also recruited in a variety of other 
social (e.g., theory of mind) or cognitive (e.g., working memory) processes. In short, there is no 
special part of the brain devoted to moral reasoning. They take this as evidence that humans do 
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not possess a distinct moral faculty, but instead moral judgments arise from domain general 
cognitive, social, and affective processes. 
 
3.3.3 Bridging assumptions in fMRI studies 
 
Each of these studies takes an apparent mismatch between fMRI data and what psychological 
theory would predict (given some view of how psychological constructs map onto the working 
parts of the brain) as evidence of a need to revise one’s cognitive ontology. For instance, the idea 
that moral reasoning depends on a special set of moral rules (Mikhail 2007) seems at odds with 
the fact that the brain regions recruited for moral judgments (assuming the scenarios present 
ecologically valid instances of moral judgments) are just different permutations of areas involved 
in garden variety emotional, cognitive, and social functions. This line of thinking suggests there 
are no special moral rules since there is no special part of the brain that houses them. But what 
does it take for fMRI data to provide evidence for or against some cognitive theory? Can 
neuroscientists really look at a brain scan and conclude that some cognitive theory, such as basic 
emotion theory, or moral grammar theory, is mistaken about the functional components of the 
mind? 
As I mentioned above, some researchers are skeptical about the very notion that fMRI, or 
any neuroimaging technique, could tell us something about how the mind works (Fodor 1999, 
Coltheart 2004, 2006). According to this way of thinking, psychological theories do not make 
predictions about brain activity patterns, so brain activity patterns cannot conflict with them. My 
reply follows a line of thinking proposed by Roskies (2009, see also Nathan and Del Pinal 2016): 
Indeed, psychological theories alone—e.g., boxological models or computational models pitched 
 54 
in mathematical terms—do not make predictions about patterns of brain activations. The ability 
to link BOLD activation patterns to cognitive theories depends on a set of auxiliary hypotheses 
or bridging assumptions specifying how neural tissue implements cognitive functions. A brief 
example will illustrate this point. 
Suppose a neuroscientist wants to know if top-down attention and working memory are 
the same cognitive process. A series of fMRI studies reveal that both working memory and top-
down attention robustly elicit activation in DLPFC. For simplicity’s sake, assume that DLPFC is 
the only region differentially activated by top-down attention and working memory tasks. Does 
this mean that working memory and top-down attention are the same cognitive process? The 
answer depends on facts about the brain. If each brain area performs a single function, then it is 
likely that “top-down attention” and “working memory” are different terms for the same 
cognitive function. If however, brain areas have radically context-sensitive functions—i.e. they 
perform different mechanistic or computational operations—then it remains possible that “top-
down attention” and “working memory” denote quite different cognitive functions that happen to 
be carried out by the same brain area. In short, the idea that the anatomical modularity of the 
brain mirrors the functional modularity of our cognitive architecture—i.e. that each brain region 
carries out one unique functional component of cognition—acts as a bridging assumption that 
allows neuroimaging results to speak to cognitive constructs (see also Bergeron 2007). 
Thus Fodor (1999) and Coltheart (2006) are simply wrong to think that fMRI results 
cannot inform cognitive theorizing. However, the value of fMRI for testing cognitive ontologies 
depends on the bridging assumptions used to link fMRI findings to psychological kinds. And 
there is no guarantee that these bridging assumptions are true—for example, in Chapter 2, I 
showed that the assumption that the brain’s anatomical modularity corresponds neatly to the 
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functional architecture of cognition is likely unwarranted. In fact, many of the bridging 
assumptions that neuroimagers invoke are largely unexplicated or, when they are, untested. 
In what follows, I demonstrate that: (1) Cognitive inferences in different fMRI experiments rely 
on different bridging assumptions, (2) These assumptions often hinge on facts about the brain’s 
functional topography, and (3) These assumptions vary in both their strength (i.e. in extent to 
which they make commitments about structure function mappings) and their plausibility (i.e. the 
extent to which the assumption is likely given what we know about the brain). In other words, 
while we may lack ground truth about the status of many bridging assumptions, we can assess 
their credibility given what we know now (see Roskies 2009 for an optimistic picture, see 
Coltheart 2013 for a pessimistic one). Then I argue that, in fact, many of the bridging 
assumptions currently used to link fMRI data to cognitive ontologies are implausible or overly 
strong given the state of human brain mapping. 
 
3.4 A BRIDGE TOO FAR? FAILURES OF BRIDGING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
3.4.1 Neural reuse and dedicated substrates 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, a plausible view of the brain’s functional topography—in light of 
the multi-functionality, and hence low selectivity, of individual brain areas—is a picture in 
which: (1) Many cognitive functions will map onto large-scale brain networks instead of 
individual regions, and (2) The component operations Фs performed by individual regions or 
mid-scale brain networks are extensively re-deployed for different cognitive capacities ψs. While 
many philosophers (Lloyd 2000, Bergeron 2007) and cognitive scientists (McIntosh 2000, Uttal 
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2001, Anderson 2010) advocate this picture as a corrective to what they perceive as an overly 
modular, region-focused view of brain mapping—offenders frequently include Kanwisher et al. 
(1997), Saxe and Kaniwsher (2003), Kanwisher (2010), etc.—the consequences of accepting 
such a view for psychological inferences in fMRI are rarely discussed in detail (but see Poldrack 
2006, Anderson 2010). 
Take Greene and Haidt’s (2002) assertion that since fMRI reveals no distinctly “moral” 
centers of the brain, moral judgment is not a unique psychological capacity. This inference relies 
on a bridging assumption that each psychological capacity has a unique or dedicated neural 
substrate. In light of recent developments in brain mapping, this assumption is misguided. Given 
the high degree of multi-functionality at the level of individual regions, there will be significant 
overlap between the functional networks that carry out different cognitive functions. If the same 
set of brain regions can combine, and recombine, to produce different psychological capacities, 
then it may be rare to find regions dedicated to a single cognitive function. 
Or consider Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams’ (2003) claim that pain and social 
exclusion many of the same brain areas—e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior 
insula—and thus we should understand social exclusion as a manifestation of somatic pain. This 
inference relies on a bridging assumption that neural overlap indicates psychological overlap. 
Put differently, shared neural substrates indicate shared psychological operations. This bridging 
principle is weaker than the assumption of dedicated substrates because it allows for the 
possibility that psychological capacities can share component operations. Nevertheless, the 
assumption is still overly strong given the degree of neural reuse observed in human neocortex 
(Poldrack 2006, Anderson 2010, 2014). 
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First, it is possible that some brain areas perform different computations, or implement 
different operations, in different neural contexts. In this case, a region might perform quite 
different functions when recruited for different contexts. But even if we suppose that each region 
performs the same operation Ф in different contexts (C1, C2, C3, etc.), this does not guarantee 
that neural overlap (e.g., psychological capacities sharing one or more region in common) 
corresponds to the kind of psychological similarity that researchers often imagine. My concern is 
that neuroscientists often take neural overlap to indicate similarity at the level of capacities, 
rather than constituent roles. 
Neural reuse forces psychologists to confront the fact that the operations Фs composing a 
capacity of interest may be quite different than the capacities themselves. Tettamanti et al. (2009) 
argue that Broca’s area is recruited for both visual pattern learning and speech production. This 
means, ipso facto, that pattern learning and speech production share a degree of neural overlap. 
Nevertheless, visual pattern learning and speech production are, in many senses, different 
functions. One involves motor control; the other is visual. One involves learning new patterns; 
the other involves using stored pattern to execute motor commands. Tettamanti et al.’s (2009) 
claim that Broca’s area is for “syntax without language” is simply that learning complex visual 
patterns involves some of the same computations deployed in producing speech. 
Bechtel (2005) argues that a tendency to elide capacities and operations during 
functional analysis occurs in other domains of science. According to Bechtel, biochemists 
working on the mechanisms of fermentation kept trying to analyze the constituent chemical 
operations as fermentations themselves.29 For example, they would ask of intermediate stage of 
the process whether it would ferment as rapidly as sugar. It was not until organic chemistry 
                                                
29	  For a detailed description of the historical case, see Bechtel (2005, 318).	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provided a general set operations—e.g., phosophorylation—involving the addition or subtraction 
of functional groups, that they began to make significant progress in understanding the 
mechanism of fermentation. In these cases, scientists use functional vocabulary appropriate to 
the functioning of a whole mechanism (fermentation), and apply it to constituent operations of 
the system (e.g., the set of reactions involved in fermentating sugar into acohol). 
There is a similar tendency, I think, for cognitive neuroscientists to take neural overlap to 
indicate functional similarity at the level of capacities rather than the level of roles or operations. 
For example, neuroscientists will see an area involved in social cognition deployed in a general 
cognitive task and suppose that the task itself is somehow social. Eisenberger, Lieberman, and 
Williams (2003) claim that the recruitment of regions like the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
and the anterior insula in both pain and social exclusion suggests that social exclusion is a form 
of somatic pain. But both of these regions are implicated in a host of functions (Menon and 
Uddin 2010)—that have nothing to do with pain experience per se. Instead, they may have to do 
with aversion/avoidance, attentional modulation, or even the detection of salient environmental 
stimuli. Neural overlap can indicate that two processes have similar downstream consequences—
e.g., perhaps pain, social rejection, and other functions all elicit avoidance responses—or 
indicate shared operations that bear little resemblance to the capacities of interest.  
Finally, some neuroscientists argue that neural dissociations—i.e. differences in patterns 
of BOLD activity—can be used to motivate splitting cognitive kinds. For example, Henson et al, 
(1999) use BOLD dissociations to motivate a dual-process account of recognition memory in 
which “recollection” and “familiarity” are understood as distinct processes. This stands in 
contrast to theorists who see both knowing and remembering as the same basic process operating 
at different strengths. These inferences rely on the bridging assumption if two tasks elicit 
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activation in different parts of the brain, those tasks likely recruit different cognitive processes. 
In a sense, this is a fairly weak bridging assumption since it mainly relies on the fact that 
different brain regions perform different functions. One problem for this assumption would be if 
the brain exhibits a high degree of degeneracy—i.e. if many different brain regions subserve the 
same basic cognitive function in different circumstances (Figdor 2010, Price and Friston 2002). 
Another problem is that the same distributed network may carry out both functions, but exhibit 
different activation peaks in each case. Despite these problems, I think that if two kinds of tasks 
robustly exhibit activation in non-overlapping brain areas, and the regions in question are not 
connected to one another; this provides some evidence that the tasks tap into different cognitive 
processes. The problem is that many tasks of interest exhibit somewhat overlapping patterns of 
BOLD activity. 
Certainly, many of the concerns I have just laid out will be susceptible to a challenge 
from best practices. For example, anatomical findings can shed light on whether two tasks with 
different activation peaks are plausible part of the same anatomical network. Likewise, it is 
possible for neuroscientists to avoid importing the language of capacities when describing shared 
neural substrates. For instance, Aminoff, Kveraga, and Barr (2013) do not take the recruitment of 
parahippocampal cortex for not just scene processing, but also spatial navigation, and odor-odor 
pairings to indicate that odor-odor pairings are processes “visually;” instead they posit a shared 
component operation. Nevertheless, many of the problematic assumptions I identified are 
routinely used in drawing cognitive inferences from fMRI experiments. Furthermore, in many 
cases—e.g., the degree to which the brain exhibits degeneracy, or the degree to which the 
functions of individual brain regions are context-sensitive—it is unknown whether the bridging 
assumption is a good one. In the following section, I argue that this general problem is 
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compounded by the fact that in many cases, it is difficult to even specify the neural predictions a 
cognitive theory should make (to say nothing about whether that or not that prediction relies on 
warranted assumptions about neural tissue). This is especially true of cognitive questions that go 
beyond “counting” the number of processes present or absent in performing a task. I elaborate on 
this idea using the case of basic emotion theory. 
 
3.4.2 A case: fMRI and basic emotion theory 
 
Having illustrated some of the challenges associated with fMRI-based cognitive ontology 
revision, I now turn to the case of basic emotion theory to further analyze the challenges 
associated with bringing fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision. In particular, I focus on 
Lindquist and colleagues’ (2012) claim that the brain does not respect basic emotion categories, 
and therefore emotions such as “anger” or “disgust” are illegitimate psychological constructs. 
My main point here is that using fMRI to assess construct validity depends not only on general 
assumptions about how cognitive functions map onto the brain—e.g., most cognitive functions 
are carried out by individual brain regions—but also on bridging assumptions that articulate the 
neural predictions of specific cognitive theories. Coltheart (2013) calls these assumptions “neural 
embellishments.” There are often deep disagreements about the empirical predictions of 
cognitive theories, and these issues apply to fMRI just as they do to other experimental 
paradigms (e.g., behavioral measures or neuropsychological dissociations). 
Basic emotion theory—and influential theory of the emotions associated with Charles 
Darwin (1872), Paul Ekman (1973), and others—proposes that emotions fall into discrete 
categories such as disgust, anger, sadness, happiness, fear, and surprise. A central tenet of basic 
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emotion theory is that humans, owing to their common evolutionary lineage, contain a universal 
set of core “affect programs” consisting of stereotyped expressive, physiological, 
neurobiological, and behavioral components (Ekman 1999, Izard 2011). According to basic 
emotion theorists, a key prediction of the theory is that basic emotions, such as anger and 
sadness, have “unique physiological and neural profiles” (Hamann 2012). In other words, basic 
emotion theory predicts that the brain has a system devoted to anger, a system devoted to disgust, 
etc. Presumably, the same core systems are active during different bouts of these emotions. By 
contrast, social constructionists (Lindquist and Barrett 2008) hold that emotions arise from 
different mixtures of a common set of cognitive (e.g., evaluative), physiological, and social-
cognitive elements, such that: (1) The brain has no identifiable system for happiness, fear, etc., 
and (2) Different instances of what we call “fear,” would consist of different neural and 
psychological ingredients. 
Thus basic emotion theory predicts that the brain has distinct, consistently identifiable 
systems for basic emotion categories—e.g., the brain has an anger system, a disgust system, etc. 
The amygdala, for example, is usually associated with fear. Not only do fMRI studies of fear 
typically recruit the amygdala, but patients with amygdala lesions also experience decreased fear 
responses. One patient with bilateral amygdala lesions was able to withstand startling, proximity 
to snakes and spiders, and other fearful stimuli, without exhibiting a response (Feinstein et al. 
2011). Similarly, the insula is associated with disgust. Patients with damage to the anterior insula 
often report reduced disgust in response to pictures of common elicitors (e.g., feces, spoiled 
food, or mutilated bodies) and have difficulties recognizing disgusted reactions on others’ faces 
(Calder et al. 2000, Kipps et al. 2007). Basic emotion theorists (e.g., Ekman 1999) argue that the 
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selective association of distinct brain regions (e.g., anterior insula) with distinct emotion 
categories (e.g., disgust) supports basic emotion theory. 
Lindquist et al., however, claim that fMRI findings contradict the neuroscientific 
predictions of basic emotion theory. They performed the largest meta-analysis of fMRI studies of 
emotion to date. They identified a set of regions consistently activated in studies of emotion 
(e.g., insula, orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, etc.) and tested the extent to which each region was 
associated with a single basic emotion category (e.g., anger or fear). Their main finding was that 
every region in the set is recruited for multiple basic emotion categories. For example, the 
amygdala is recruited not only for fear, but also anger. The anterior insula is recruited not just for 
disgust, but also sadness. This lack of specificity held for every cortical and limbic structure in 
the analysis. Contrary to what basic emotion theory predicts, the brain does not seem to possess 
systems dedicated to particular basic emotion categories. Lindquist et al. conclude that the brain 
does not respect basic emotion categories, and thus anger, disgust, etc. are illegitimate 
psychological constructs that are ripe for elimination. 
A shortcoming of Lindquist et al.’s approach is that only looks for specificity at the level 
of areas (Scarantino 2012, Hamann 2012). That is, their findings are consistent with the 
possibility that basic emotions are associated with distributed functional networks rather than 
individual regions. As we have seen, the brain might contain networks devoted to particular 
functions—e.g., a network for word form recognition and a network for tactile object 
recognition—that exhibit some degree of regional overlap—e.g., in posterior lateral fusiform 
gyrus. In a similar fashion, basic emotion categories may correspond to large-scale brain 
networks that contain some overlapping regions. As Scarantino (2012) notes, Lindquist et al. 
seem to embrace a “radical localizationism” in which basic emotion theory predicts not just that 
 63 
the brain has a disgust system, but that this system is localizable to some particular region. This 
seems like an overly strong bridging assumption.  
Why do Lindquist et al. (2012) contend that a lack of specificity at the level of individual 
regions is troubling for basic emotion theory? One might think that they simply neglect the 
possibility of specificity at the level of networks. However, Lindquist et al. (2012) acknowledge 
this possibility, writing, “it remains a possibility that we failed to locate a brain basis for specific 
emotion categories because emotion categories are represented as [distinct] anatomical networks 
of brain regions” (2012, 141). As it turns out, recent studies support this basic picture. Saarimäki 
and colleagues (2015), for example, report MVPA results supporting distinct networks for 
distinct basic emotion categories. Consistent with Lindquist et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis, these 
networks overlap, particularly in limbic structures. But while they are open to the possibility that 
basic emotion categories map onto networks rather than individual regions, it is clear that 
Lindquist and colleagues consider neural overlap between basic emotion systems (even if 
emotions map onto large-scale networks) problematic for basic emotion theory. According to 
this line of thinking, basic emotions cannot be “psychologically basic” if they are built up out of 
psychological components that are shared between emotion categories (see Scarantino and 
Griffiths 2011). Their claim is therefore not that basic emotion categories must map onto 
individual regions, but that they must have distinct neural substrates. 
The key question becomes: Is basic emotion theory consistent with some degree of neural 
and hence functional overlap between emotion categories? While some basic emotion theorists 
(e.g., Ekman and Cordaro 2011) seem to advocate wholly distinct neural systems (Lindquist et 
al. 2012 obviously agree), I think this requirement is too strong. Basic emotion theory (Ekman 
1973) is certainly committed to distinct neural and physiological processes for different basic 
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emotion categories—e.g., disgust should affect the viscera in a certain way, be associated with a 
certain facial expression, etc. But this basic picture is compatible with some degree of functional 
overlap between basic emotion categories. Consider a region involved in the control of a 
particular facial muscle. Even if anger and disgust involve different facial expressions, these 
movements might involve some of the same muscle groups (Ekman and Friesen 1976), and 
hence both recruit this region. This is equally true of the physiological changes involved in 
emotional expression. Anger and fear may both elicit activation in the amygdala because they 
both involve sympathetic nervous system activation (Charney and Deutch 1996). 
The issue is thus not whether basic emotion categories will share some degree of neural 
overlap (they will), but whether this overlap suggests that emotional experiences are cobbled 
together from a host of evaluative and social-cognitive processes, perhaps in a heterogeneous 
fashion—i.e. one in which different bouts of “disgust” do not involve the same component 
processes. By itself, the fact that basic emotion categories seem to map onto large-scale networks 
with overlapping components does not violate the predictions of basic emotion theory, or support 
a social constructionist account. Once again, we are in a position where general assumptions 
about how cognitive functions map onto the brain, or about the neuroscientific predictions of 
particular cognitive theories, are not enough to bring fMRI to bear on cognitive ontologies. What 
is needed is a deeper understanding of the precise operations those regions are performing. 
 
3.5 PATTERN CLASSIFICATION AND COGNITIVE ONTOLOGIES 
 
So far, I have shown that many cases of fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision rely on 
problematic bridging assumptions about how cognitive functions map onto the brain—e.g., 
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neural overlap reflects psychological overlap or each cognitive function has a distinct neural 
substrate. Neuroscientists increasingly report that cognitive capacities map onto large-scale brain 
networks (Mesulam 1990, McIntosh 2000), and that individual regions are recycled in many 
different capacities (Poldrack 2006, Anderson 2010). While most neuroscientists acknowledge 
these changes, the extent to which they challenge standard cognitive inferences in fMRI is often 
underappreciated. How should neuroscientists respond to these difficulties? One option is to 
embark on the project of functional revision described in Chapter 2—i.e. to reconceptualize the 
functions performed by individual brain regions. A second option is to embrace new techniques 
for judging similarities and differences in patterns of brain activation. 
Recently, a number of neuroscientists have argued that MVPA and related methods can 
be used to identify the presence of distinct cognitive processes, and is therefore useful for 
validating and invalidating psychological constructs (Lenartowicz et al. 2010, Poldrack 2010, 
Woo et al. 2014, Saarimäki et al. 2015). This fairly new strategy relies on the fairly modest 
assumption that different cognitive constructs—e.g., anger versus disgust—elicit different 
patterns of brain activation that machine-learning algorithms can detect. According to this view, 
discrimination warrants cognitive kind splitting. In this section, I critique the use of MVPA and 
other pattern classification techniques for cognitive ontology revision. I claim that successful 
discrimination is insufficient for compelling kind splitting. I argue that in many cases, 
classification success may be driven by differences that are irrelevant from the standpoint of the 
cognitive constructs one is hoping to test. I call these potential confounds “additional constructs” 
and “implementation differences.” 
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3.5.1 Classifier performance and cognitive constructs 
 
Before delving into the issues surrounding MVPA and cognitive ontology revision, a brief note 
about pattern classifiers in fMRI research. In standard fMRI research, BOLD associations 
(response similarities) and dissociations (response differences) are often taken as evidence for 
the recruitment of similar or distinct cognitive processes (Henson 2006, Machery 2012). This can 
be done in quantitative or quantitative ways. However, there are limitations to what BOLD 
differences traditional univariate techniques, which rely on signal changes in individual voxels or 
ROIs, can detect. For example, some functions are co-localized in the same anatomical regions. 
That is, some signal differences are expressed not in what voxels exhibit differential activity, but 
in the way in which those voxels are differentially active. For example, Tasks A and B might 
both elicit significant activation in voxels 1, 2, and 3 relative to a matched control, but in Task A, 
voxel 1 is more active while voxels 2 and 3 are less active, while in Task B, voxel 1 is less active 
while voxels 2 and 3 are more active. 
In these cases, MVPA and other pattern classifier techniques, which can detect patterned 
differences across sets of voxels or ROIs, are more sensitive than traditional univariate analyses 
(Haxby et al. 2001, Norman et al. 2006). In a standard MVPA design, researchers train a 
machine-learning algorithm (e.g., a linear Support Vector Machine) on sets of brain scans (e.g., 
dogs versus cats, or happy brains versus sad ones), and then use the classifier to predict which 
category a novel, untrained scan belongs to. Classification success is often measured in terms of 
the percentage (0-100) of novel scans the classifier is able to correctly discriminate. Many 
authors (Lenartowicz et al. 2010, Poldrack 2010) argue that since different cognitive constructs 
will elicit different patterns of brain activity, successful discrimination can indicate the presence 
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of distinct cognitive kinds. The basic intuition is that cognitive similarity will be reflected in the 
similarity of BOLD activation patterns. 
According to this line of thinking, MVPA can be used to justify cognitive kind splitting. 
Woo et al. (2014) argue that while univariate analyses (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, and 
Williams 2003) show that pain and social exclusion recruit many of the same regions, MVPA 
can be used to reliably discriminate pain from social rejection. Thus social exclusion is not a 
variant of somatic pain. Likewise, Saarimäki et al. 2015 claim that while individual regions are 
not specific for basic emotion categories, activation patterns across distributed sets of voxels can 
be used to discriminate anger from fear, fear from disgust, etc. This suggests that MVPA and 
other pattern classifiers may be more useful for carving the brain at its functional joints than 
traditional univariate analyses. 
Lenartowicz et al. (2010) explicitly set out to validate a taxonomy of cognitive control 
constructs using a pattern classifier.30 “Cognitive control” is a heterogeneous category of 
psychological constructs related to executing goal-directed behaviors and exerting control over 
competing behavioral responses. Cognitive control consists of many different hypothetical 
constructs—e.g., working memory, task switching, response inhibition, and response selection—
that are operationalized using characteristic tasks (e.g., the Trailmaking Task is widely used to 
measure task switching). Lenartowicz et al. reasoned that: “these constructs [e.g., task switching] 
should show a good deal of selectivity in their neural representations if they capture distinct 
components of cognitive control” (2010, 683). For example, if two tasks both allegedly measure 
response inhibition, those tasks should elicit similar patterns of BOLD activity. Likewise, if two 
tasks allegedly measure different constructs, they should be highly discriminable. 
                                                
30 Lenartowicz et al. (2010) used text mining to obtain fMRI scans in BrainMap (Laird, Lancaster, and Fox 2005) 
associated with Sabb et al.’s (2008) ontology of cognitive control constructs.	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Lenartowicz et al. measured the extent to which distinct cognitive control constructs 
could be discriminated from one another using a pattern classifier applied to BOLD data.31 They 
tested each cognitive control construct pair (e.g., task switching versus response inhibition, 
response inhibition versus working memory, etc.) and, as a control, tested each cognitive control 
construct against a language construct. First, they found that each cognitive control construct 
could be distinguished from the language construct. Then, they found that while some cognitive 
control constructs (e.g., working memory and response selection) could be distinguished from 
each other, others (e.g., response inhibition and task switching) could not be reliably 
distinguished from each other.  
For Lenartowicz et al. (2010, see also Poldrack 2010) these findings present a kind of 
“proof of concept” that fMRI-based pattern classification is useful for validating cognitive 
ontologies. The fact that each control constructs could be distinguished from a linguistic 
construct, but some cognitive control constructs were confused with each other, provides prima 
facie evidence that similarities and differences in BOLD activation reflect the relatedness of 
cognitive kinds.32 Lenartowicz et al. argue that constructs that can reliably be discriminated from 
each other—e.g., response selection and working memory—are good candidates for distinct 
psychological kinds, while ones that cannot be discriminated successfully—e.g., response 
inhibition and task switching—may be different verbal labels for the same underlying construct.  
This study represents an important turn in the literature on fMRI-based cognitive 
ontology revision. If distinct cognitive kinds elicit distinct patterns of BOLD activation, then 
                                                
31 For a full description of the classification method, see Lenartowicz et al. 2010.	  
32 Of course, demonstrating that cognitive control constructs form a “family” of psychological kinds would require 
testing discriminability against a wide range of other cognitive kinds (e.g., perceptual, linguistic, memory-related, 
etc.) rather than a single, randomly chosen construct.	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neuroscientists can test their cognitive ontologies against fMRI data.33 Lenartowicz et al. make 
two claims. First, they argue that “brain activation in conjunction with the label RS [response 
selection] was distinguishable from that reported in conjunction with CC [cognitive control], RI 
[response inhibition], or WM [working memory]. Based on this result, we may conclude that RS 
represents one distinct control function, and thus a distinct entity in the ontology of cognitive 
control functions” (2010, 687). In other words, the ability to discriminate activation patterns is 
evidence of in favor of kind splitting.34 Second, they argue “the similarity between [for example] 
RI [response inhibition] and WM [working memory] may suggest that these constructs share 
neural systems and thus may be part of the same control function” (2010, 688). In other words, 
failure of discrimination is evidence in favor of kind lumping. 
The main issue raised by this study (and others such as Saarimäki et al. 2015), is whether 
the ability to discriminate brain activation patterns related to construct labels reveal whether or 
not those constructs should be distinct items in one’s ontology. One problem is whether a failure 
to discriminate supports lumping. Another problem is whether successful discrimination supplies 
evidence in favor of kind splitting. In what follows, I raise some challenges for the claim that 
discriminability (using a pattern classifier) provides strong evidence in favor of kind splitting. I 
will briefly note that the main challenge for lumping kinds on the basis of a failure to 
discriminate is the problem of negative evidence in MVPA. Different classifiers are able to pick 
up on qualitatively different patterns—for example, a linear pattern classifier can only pick up on 
linearly separable differences between patterns. Furthermore, training datasets can be richer or 
                                                
33 Poldrack at el. (2011) have recently developed a “Cognitive Atlas” that extensively outlines taxonomic 
relationships between cognitive kinds. One of the goals of this atlas is to codify cognitive ontologies to test against 
fMRI data. The Cognitive Atlas is online at: (http://www.cognitiveatlas.org).	  
34 Perhaps Lenartowicz et al. (2010) intend to make the weaker claim that discriminability (on the basis of brain 
activation patterns) is necessary for identifying distinct constructs, but not sufficient. However, passages like the one 
here suggest an inclination toward the stronger sufficiency claim.	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more impoverished. This means that whether a classifier can discriminate patterns will depend 
on many factors related to classifier performance and experimental design.  
 
3.5.2 Two confounds: additional constructs and implementation differences 
 
Neuroscientists want to use successful pattern classification to reflect the recruitment of distinct 
cognitive constructs—i.e. discriminability warrants kind splitting. But, as Machery (2012) notes, 
different psychological tasks will usually elicit somewhat different patterns of BOLD activation; 
the challenge is determining what counts as a relevant difference from the standpoint of 
cognitive theorizing. Unfortunately, many MVPA studies contain sources of irrelevant 
differences that may be controlled for in traditional designs. These confounds come in two 
flavors: additional constructs and implementation differences. 
 
Additional Constructs 
In traditional designs, neuroimagers use cognitive subtraction to isolate BOLD signal 
related to a construct of interest. Since MVPA studies do not involve cognitive subtraction—i.e. 
the classifier operates on BOLD data, not a statistical map—researchers often train a pattern 
classifier on stimuli that differ in both the cognitive construct of interest—e.g., in what emotion 
is elicited—and in what other processes—e.g., perceptual processes—are present during the 
scan.35 Therefore, successful discrimination may be driven by the presence of irrelevant 
additional cognitive processes. Consider, for example, Saarimäki et al. 2015’s use of MVPA to 
                                                
35	  While it is possible, and often desirable, to select regions of interest for MVPA based on previous subtractions 
(e.g., one might use a subtraction contrast to generate ROIs for MVPA): (1) Researchers sometimes neglect this 
issue entirely, opting for whole brain analyses, and (2) Spreading activation may remain a problem since MVPA 
does not use cognitive subtraction.	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discriminate basic emotion categories. Saarimäki et al. used emotional movies—e.g., movies that 
elicit anger, disgust, etc.—to derive their classifications. But emotional movies do not only differ 
in terms of the emotions they elicit; they also differ in numerous other factors including visual 
stimuli (e.g., pleasant ones versus unpleasant ones), auditory stimuli (e.g., high pitched versus 
low pitched music), etc. Thus there is no guarantee that distinct affective processes drive the 
classifier’s selectivity. 
The problem of additional constructs is most salient in studies that use different “delivery 
methods” for different stimulus categories—e.g., studies which present stimuli via different 
sensory modalities, or use different tasks as proxies for the same construct. For example, Woo et 
al. (2014) are interested in comparing neural representations of pain and social exclusion using 
MVPA. They found that a classifier could distinguish a painful stimulus (caused by intense heat) 
from a social rejection stimulus (caused by a picture of an ex-patner) 100 percent of the time. 
Furthermore, a classifier trained to discriminate a neutral warm stimulus from a painful heat was 
not useful for discriminating a neutral face stimulus from the face of an ex-partner and vice 
versa. However, these stimuli differ not only in whether or not they both recruit “pain,” but also 
the intensity of the thermal stimulus, the social context of the encounter, and many other factors. 
Thus it is not clear that discrimination success is driven solely by whether or not a pattern for 
somatic pain is present in the stimulus. 
It is likely that the presence of additional constructs also confound Lenartowicz et al.’s 
(2010) use of pattern classifiers to test an ontology of cognitive control. This is because 
Lenartowicz et al. used heterogeneous sets of tasks as proxies for individual constructs. 
Neuroscientists use different tasks (the Go/NoGo Task or the Stop-Signal Task) to operationalize 
the same cognitive construct (response inhibition). But, there is no guarantee that these tasks 
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recruit one and the same neural or cognitive processes. This problem, widely discussed by 
Sullivan (2009, 2010) in the philosophical literature, occurs when scientists neglect to test their 
operational schemes. 
Lenartowicz et al. found that response inhibition—a cognitive construct defined as the 
conjunction of BOLD signal from the Go/NoGo Task, Stop-Signal Task, and Antisaccade 
Task—could be distinguished from working memory and response selection, but not task 
switching. One possibility is that response inhibition and task switching are the same construct; 
another is that both response inhibition and task switching are mixtures of constructs recruited by 
different tasks. For example, Swick, Ashley, and Turken (2011) performed a meta-analysis of 
fMRI data for two response inhibition tasks—the Go/NoGo Task and the Stop-Signal Task. They 
found some degree of BOLD overlap, but also considerable difference, suggesting that while the 
two tasks may share functional components, they should not necessarily be considered 
“interchangeable measures of response inhibition” (2011, 1662). According to this concern, 
response inhibition might consist of constructs 1, 2, and 3 recruited by Tasks A, B, and C while 
task switching consists of 2, 3, and 4 recruited by Tasks D, E, and F. In this case, the success or 
failure of a classifier would say nothing of interest about the “constructs” one is intending to test. 
As Figdor (2011) recognizes, we cannot test our ontologies of cognitive kinds without 
simultaneously testing our ontologies of tasks. 
 
Implementation Differences 
 Another source of irrelevant differences driving successful fMRI-based classification is 
what I call “implementation differences.” The general worry is that we have good reason to think 
that, in some cases, MVPA is sensitive to differences in the way a single process is implemented 
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rather than in what kind of process is implemented. In other words, the same system cognitive 
system can operate on different inputs, which will exhibit somewhat different patterns of neural 
activity; thus it is difficult to tell which discriminations are due to differences in the kind of 
process taking place.  
In a famous early MVPA study, Haxby et al. (2001) trained a classifier to judge whether 
a brain scan resulted from a person observing a shoe or a bottle. The classifier was successful at 
discriminating shoe scans from bottle scans. On the face of it, seeing a shoe is not a different 
“kind” of cognitive process from seeing a bottle. Both are typically thought of as instances of 
feeding a general system for visual object recognition (ventral visual areas like lateral occipital 
complex, inferotemporal cortex, etc.) different inputs. Similarly, one could imagine that a 
classifier could be trained to discriminate particular memories—e.g., remembering one’s 
wedding versus one’s dissertation defense—without warranting the claim that different cognitive 
processes or constructs are involved in constructing these memories. 
Philosophically, there are several ways one might want to put this concern. One is that 
MVPA discriminations might be driven by differences in either vehicles or contents—i.e. in the 
way that something is represented or in what content is represented (see Crane 1995)—but only 
difference in vehicles warrant positing differences in cognitive kinds. Another that MVPA 
discriminations might be driven by the same mechanism operating on different inputs—e.g., a 
camera takes a picture of a bottle versus a shoe—rather than the presence of different kinds of 
mechanisms, while only the latter would warrant positing different cognitive kinds (Craver 
2009). 
In both cases, the fact that MVPA can discriminate seeing a shoe from seeing a bottle 
provides a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that it is useful for individuating cognitive kinds. 
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Lenartowicz et al. (2010) hope that successful classification reflects the recruitment of distinct 
cognitive processes. But if a sufficiently sensitive classifier can discriminate virtually any two 
tasks, this undermines the usefulness of discriminations for tracking interesting psychological 
differences (e.g., between kinds of processes or distinct constructs).  
 
3.5.3 Controlling for confounds 
 
Since discrimination may be driven by implementation differences, or by the presence of 
additional constructs, one cannot equate “cognitive constructs” with “stimulus classes that can be 
successfully classified.” This does not mean that MVPA is useless for validating cognitive 
ontologies. However, it does mean that neuroscientists will need to develop novel experimental 
controls and ways of integrating pattern classification with other findings. Here I briefly review 
some options. 
One might control for the presence of additional constructs by adopting clever cross-
classification designs. Saarimäki et al. (2015) validated their classification of basic emotion 
categories by testing whether a classifier trained to discriminate emotions on the basis of movies 
(e.g., sad film clips versus happy ones) could successfully classify scans resulting from 
internally-generated emotion states (e.g., someone thinking about a sad memory versus a fond 
one). Likewise, it is possible to evoke the same cognitive process using different stimulus 
modalities. For example, Damarla, Cherkassky, and Just (2016) found that a pattern classifier 
trained on representations of quantity (e.g., 3 visually presented dots versus five visually 
presented dots) was successful at discriminating representations of quantity in other modalities 
(e.g., hearing 3 tones versus 5 tones). These controls make it more plausible that successful 
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discrimination is driven by neural representations of quantity rather than confounding factors 
(see Kaplan, Man, and Greening 2015 for an interesting discussion). 
It is harder to control for implementation differences. One possibility is to adopt a 
compare activation patterns resulting from different processes acting on the same stimuli and/or 
contents. For example, one could compare activation patterns seeing an apple, seeing a lemon, 
remembering an apple, and remembering a lemon. The problem here is that discrimination 
success will not be sufficient to compare these patterns, since it may be possible to achieve high 
discrimination between all four categories. What is needed is some way of comparing the 
similarity of the patterns used to classify each category; for this, researchers will need to adopt 
methods such as representational similarity analysis, (Norman et al. 2006). In any cases it is clear 
that classification alone is not sufficient to warrant cognitive kind splitting. 
 
3.6 RETHINKING THE DIRECTION OF REVISION 
 
In this chapter, I argue that fMRI typically only provides weak evidence in favor of cognitive 
ontology revision. In other words, fMRI is not currently very useful for explicitly testing our 
cognitive ontology. While the problems I raise are not necessarily in principle problems (and 
some of them may be corrected by current best practices), they present a cautionary tale for 
many popular inferences on neuroimaging data. First, I situate the move toward cognitive 
ontology revision in the context of psychological construct validation. Then I argue that using 
fMRI to validate or invalidate psychological constructs depends on bridging assumptions about 
how cognitive functions are instantiated in neural systems. I show that many of the bridging 
assumptions—e.g., each cognitive function has a unique neural substrate, neural overlap 
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suggests psychological overlap, each regions performs a single function, etc.—on which these 
inferences depend are implausible given current views of the brain’s functional topography 
(Bergeron 2007, Anderson 2010). Finally, I demonstrate why MVPA is not a panacea for the 
challenges of inferring cognitive components on the basis of neural associations and 
dissociations. 
The goal of this chapter has been to carve out a philosophical middle ground between the 
pessimistic conclusion that fMRI is irrelevant for testing our cognitive ontologies (e.g., Coltheart 
2006) and the exuberance with which many scientists proclaim that fMRI studies provide one of 
the strongest forms of evidence available for testing cognitive ontologies (e.g., Lindquist et al. 
2012). I have attempted to improve on existing philosophical discussions (e.g., Roskies 2010, 
Nathan and Del Pinal 2016) by articulating and critiquing many of the bridging assumptions at 
work in fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision. This discussion raises serious worries about 
whether cognitive neuroscience is delivering on its promise to revolutionize psychology. 
Many philosophers (Churchland 1986, Bickle 1995) and neuroscientists (Poldrack 2010, 
Anderson 2010) are enamored of the idea that psychology will be radically transformed by its 
contact with neuroscience. For what it is worth, I too think that insights from brain science are 
already transforming, and will continue to transform, our psychological taxonomy. Nevertheless, 
I am concerned that both past and current contributions of neuroscience to the taxonomy of 
psychology are probably exaggerated.  
A familiar story holds that psychologists once thought of “memory” as a unitary 
psychological kind. Then, neuropsychological studies of H.M. and other amnesiacs with damage 
to the hippocampus and medial temporal lobes generated a need to split memory into declarative 
and implicit variants (Scoville and Milner 1957, Milner, Corkin, and Teubner 1968, Cohen and 
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Squire 1980). Churchland hails this fractionation of memory as case where brain data provoked a 
revision of psychological categories, writing: “it is this unprecedented dissociation of capacities 
that has moved some neuropsychologists to postulate two memory systems, each with its own 
physiological basis” (1986, 371, emphasis added). The problem with this story, as Hatfield 
(2000, see also Frank and Badre 2015) notes, is that it is historically inaccurate. In their major 
paper splitting memory into declarative and procedural memory systems, Cohen and Squire 
(1980) traced the distinction between procedural and declarative memory to previous behavioral 
work, and even to Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) philosophical distinction between “knowing how” and 
“knowing that.” Indeed, according to Frank and Badre, Corkin (1986) “motivated the 
investigation of [of HM’s intact motor skills] with ‘observations in normal man’ that motor and 
other forms of memory were distinct” (2015, 15). 
If this historical interpretation is correct, then philosophers have routinely 
mischaracterized the significance of H.M. for theorizing about the relationship between 
psychology and neuroscience. This is not a case where brain data led to a revision of 
psychological categories, but a case in which an existing distinction in cognitive psychology led 
to a novel characterization of the function of some brain area (e.g., the studies solidified the role 
of the hippocampus and medial temporal lobes in declarative, but not procedural memory). 
Indeed, there are numerous cases in which a previously-existing psychological taxonomy—e.g., 
Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) working memory model—was used to identify functional brain 
structures. However, it is harder to find cases in which neuroimaging data compelled a radical 
revision of psychology. 
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4.0 NETWORK INFERENCES AND THE USES OF RESTING STATE fMRI 
4.1 CHAPTER 4 INTRODUCTION 
 
If my analysis in Chapter 3 is correct, then neuroscientists frequently use psychological 
distinctions—e.g., between the central executive and phonological loop components of working 
memory—to identify functional structures in the macroscale (see Sporns 2011) brain using 
fMRI. The fusiform face area, for example, was, identified as a region responsive to the BOLD 
contrast between faces and other complex objects. By contrast, it is relatively rare to find cases in 
which fMRI caused a genuine revision of cognitive theory. While some philosophers 
(Churchland 1986, Bickle 1995) yearn for brain data to overturn psychology, for the most part, 
this is not how psychology and neuroscience have historically interacted with each other. 
Recently, several prominent neuroscientists—e.g., Biswal et al. 2010—have argued that resting 
state fMRI, a novel way of analyzing fMRI data, can be used to identify functional brain 
networks without the need for psychological tasks. If this is right, then perhaps one way around 
the problems I have discussed so far—i.e. problems with specifying the functions of particular 
brain regions—is to adopt a method that permits researchers to carve the brain at its functional 
joints without a prior understanding of psychological theory. In this chapter, I examine the use of 
resting state fMRI to identify large-scale functional brain networks. The main question is: Can 
fMRI be used to identify functional brain networks in a “bottom up” fashion that does not rely on 
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prior cognitive theorizing? Note: In this dissertation chapter, I use the term “I,” but this chapter is 
fully co-authored with David Danks, professor of philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University. We 
contributed equally to the work, which I have modified to connect with the broader themes of the 
dissertation. 
Traditional fMRI experiments involve manipulating specific stimuli or tasks, and 
measuring resultant changes in the blood oxygen-dependent (BOLD) signal. In standard 
subtraction designs, researchers compare activation patterns from a task of interest (e.g., reading 
words) to patterns in a matched control task (e.g., reading meaningless non-word such as 
“BLORT”) to isolate task-related BOLD signal changes. In this framework, task manipulations 
are the independent variables, BOLD changes are the dependent variables, and other sources of 
BOLD signal fluctuation—e.g., fluctuations due to cardiac cycle, head motion, or unexpected 
task differences—are treated as sources of noise to be eliminated by sound experimental design 
or principled statistical adjustments (Purdon and Weisskoff 1998, Aguirre 2014).  
Although task-based experiments were the initial focus of fMRI research, neuroimagers 
soon began to observe a puzzling pattern. Many brain regions seem to exhibit stable, correlated, 
low frequency (~0.01-0.10 Hz) BOLD fluctuations when participants are “resting” in the scanner 
magnet between task blocks (Biswal et al. 1995, Binder et al. 1999, Gusnard and Raichle 2001, 
Raichle et al. 2001). This surprising, accidental finding led to the characterization of the so-
called “default mode network,” a set of regions whose activity is correlated at rest, but relatively 
uncorrelated during specific tasks (Raichle et al. 2001, Greicius et al. 2003). The immediate 
conclusion was that perhaps some endogenous BOLD fluctuations are not “noise,” at all, but 
instead reflect previously uncharacterized patterns of brain activity. This insight suggested a 
paradigm shift towards studying the brain’s intrinsic functional dynamics, where “intrinsic” is to 
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be understood as spontaneously or internally generated, as opposed to driven by a specific task or 
stimulus (Snyder and Raichle 2012). 
Research on the default mode network has led to the general methodological 
development of resting state fMRI. Resting state fMRI experiments measure “functional 
connectivity” patterns in resting participants. That is, they measure BOLD correlations between 
target voxels or “seed regions” (predefined brain areas) that are thought to reflect network level 
brain patterns of activity (Power et al. 2014). Resting state fMRI is a burgeoning area of clinical 
and basic brain research. As Power, Schlaggar, and Petersen (2014, 692) note, “resting state 
fMRI has grown from an unexpected observation in fMRI ‘noise’ to a major area of human 
neuroimaging.” While there is no unified goal of resting state research (more on this in 4.2), the 
basic idea is that resting state BOLD fluctuations can be used to identify and investigate 
“functional” brain networks, where here “functional” means, roughly, “performs some metabolic 
or cognitive function.” Note from the outset that “functional connectivity” is just a fancy way of 
saying “BOLD correlations;” as we will see, the actual “functional”—i.e. cognitive or 
metabolic—significance of resting state connectivity networks is often very unclear.36 
Resting state fMRI is a philosophically important enterprise. First, it represents a 
departure from the stimulus-response paradigm that characterizes much of cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience, and thus potentially provides a window on “naturalistic” (i.e., outside of the 
lab) cognition, or on psychological processes (e.g., mind wandering) that are difficult or 
impossible to study using explicit task instructions (Snyder and Raichle 2012). Second, resting 
state fMRI sidesteps one of the main critiques of task-based fMRI. Standard studies almost 
                                                
36 Throughout this chapter, I will use the terms “functional connectivity” or “connectivity network” to refer to 
correlations in the BOLD signal and the terms “functional brain network” or “functional network” to refer to 
networks of the brain that perform some cognitive or metabolic function. 
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always employ a logic of subtraction, which makes the assumption of “pure insertion” (that 
researchers can construct task-pairs that differ solely in the recruitment of one cognitive 
component), an assumption that faces significant problems (Friston et al. 1996, Van Orden and 
Paap 1997, Uttal 2001, 2008). Resting state fMRI aims to identify functional brain networks 
without making prior assumptions about the psychological differences between tasks (as there 
are no experimenter-provided tasks at all), and thus could represent a major methodological 
advance in human brain mapping. Third, resting state fMRI raises important questions about the 
value of exploratory experiments (Steinle 1997, Franklin 2005) in cognitive neuroscience. 
Proponents of resting state studies emphasize that the methodology holds the promise of 
simultaneously identifying multiple functional brain networks in a “bottom up” fashion, prior to 
any theorizing about precisely what those networks might do (Biswal et al. 2010, Snyder and 
Raichle 2012). Thus resting state fMRI may be a useful tool for discovery instead of, or in 
addition to, hypothesis testing (Biswal et al. 2010). 
At the same time, and despite the proliferation of resting state fMRI research, there is 
little consensus about what physiological or cognitive processes resting state analyses are 
actually measuring. Some researchers (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng 2014) give 
specific cognitive interpretations to resting state connectivity patterns—e.g., the default mode 
network is claimed to be associated with imagination, self-reflection, or planning—while others 
claim only that resting state analyses measure some form of endogenous or intrinsic functional 
activity—e.g., background or “housekeeping” functions that keep the brain ready to adaptively 
respond to external inputs or internal demands (Raichle 2009, Synder and Raichle 2012, Klein 
2014). Some researchers focus their efforts on regions whose activity is only or primarily 
correlated at rest (Biswal et al. 1995), while others emphasize similarities in functional 
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connectivity between tasks and rest (Bray et al. 2015, Cole et al. 2014). Given this plethora of 
theoretical interpretations, what exactly do resting state analyses tell us about the brain? This 
question has not received enough critical attention in the philosophical and scientific literature 
(though see Morcom and Fletcher 2007, Klein 2014). 
In this chapter, I examine what resting state analyses do, and do not, reveal about the 
brain’s functional organization. Proponents of the approach frequently assign functional (i.e. 
cognitive or metabolic) significance to resting state connectivity patterns. I claim that these 
inferences from statistical structure—i.e. functional connectivity patterns—to functional 
organization are likely unwarranted, and in doing so provide a novel interpretation of extant 
findings in resting state research. I argue that resting state analyses involve sampling from a 
“mixture distribution”—the probability distribution that results from sampling from multiple, 
distinct, heterogeneous populations without knowing the population from which each individual 
is drawn (Redner and Walker, 1984, Zheng and Frey 2004). That is, the functional connectivity 
patterns observed in resting state analyses may arise from temporally and causally distinct 
processes (e.g., different cognitive processes) that are blended together by current ways of 
sampling and analyzing resting state datasets. Networks inferred from data from a mixture 
distribution can be quite different from any particular component network, or even from the 
superposition of the individual networks. Thus, there is no straightforward way to attribute 
functions, cognitive or otherwise, to resting state brain networks, precisely because (on this 
view) there is no single, stable resting state network. In short: the large-scale functional 
connectivity “networks” (e.g., the default mode network) observed in resting state studies may be 
sampling artifacts rather than genuine features of the brain’s functional organization. 
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I argue that extant evidence is compatible both with this hypothesis—I refer to it as the 
“mixture” or “superposition” view—and with the thesis that resting state analyses measure the 
endogenous activity of a handful of large-scale, functional brain networks. The components of 
these mixtures may reflect the brain engaging in a series of “hidden tasks” such as imagery, inner 
speech, or planning, whether instead of or in addition to intrinsic or endogenous activity. 
Inferences from connectivity patterns to cognitive or neural function are substantially more 
complicated in resting state fMRI research than is standardly recognized. 
The superposition or mixture view has not received much discussion in the existing 
literature. I aim to remedy this situation and to make three contributions to the theoretical 
literature on resting state fMRI. First, I clarify different uses of the relatively new technique of 
resting state fMRI, as well as delineate some open controversies. Second, I aim to demonstrate 
that the superposition view is both plausible and raises an interpretive problem for the use of 
resting state analyses in brain mapping. Finally, I argue that accounting for mixtures may involve 
not only the use of new technical tools, including demixing methods such as changepoint 
detection algorithms (e.g., Adams and MacKay, 2007; Desobry, Davy, and Doncarli, 2005), but 
also relaxing the experimental standard that resting state analyses be completely cognitively 
unconstrained. There may be an interesting tradeoff between purely task-driven and task-free 
experimental designs. Some of these recommendations are already being implemented 
independently (e.g., Vemuri and Surampudi 2015), and combining them may significantly 
improve our ability to identify candidate functional networks using resting state analyses. 
 Section 4.2 reviews the experimental design of resting state studies, and explains some 
interpretations of resting state findings. Section 4.3 then presents the mixture or superposition 
view, and explains the ways in which inferences from structure to function in resting state fMRI 
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are complicated by the fact that resting state analyses involve sampling from a mixture 
distribution. In Section 4.4, I address a number of empirical objections to the superposition view, 
such as the idea that the high degree of intrasubject and intersubject consistency in resting state 
analyses rules out our interpretation. I argue that our account can withstand each of these 
objections, and conclude by discussing some methodological and theoretical implications for 
human brain mapping (Sections 4.5 and 4.6). 
 
4.2 THE USES OF RESTING STATE fMRI 
 
There is something counterintuitive about the very idea of resting state fMRI. In a traditional 
framework, the goal of fMRI experiments is to measure task-related changes in the BOLD 
signal. Under the right conditions, differential BOLD response given experimenter-manipulated 
tasks is taken to reveal something about where cognitive functions are localized and how these 
regions respond to different task conditions (Saxe, Brett, and Kanwisher 2006). The goal of these 
experiments is to tell us what some part of the brain is doing by linking BOLD changes to task 
manipulations. Even if the assumptions grounding these experiments turn out to be wrong (e.g., 
Van Orden and Paap 1997), the goal of such experiments is clear.  
In contrast, resting state fMRI experiments collect BOLD time series while participants 
are “resting,” a state operationally defined as lying passively in the scanner without explicit 
instructions (Snyder and Raichle 2012). Therefore, “the resting state is uncontrolled according to 
the usual conventions that apply to cognitive neuroimaging” (Snyder and Raichle, 2012, 
emphasis added). What epistemic benefits coincide with the loss of cognitive constraint—i.e. 
control over what participants are doing—in resting state analyses? In other words, why do 
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neuroscientists want to study the brain under conditions where they do not know what 
participants are thinking about? 
 
4.2.1 Resting state analyses 
 
It is useful to think about resting state fMRI in the broader context of exploratory experiments 
(Steinle 1997, Franklin 2005, Biswal et al. 2010) that search for meaningful patterns in data 
without an explicit theory of what gives rise to those patterns. In cellular biology, for example, 
researchers sometimes measure the mRNA transcripts in a group of cells at various times to 
determine which gene expression levels correlate with one another. Such an experiment does not 
involve manipulating an environmental factor and measuring changes in gene expression, but 
may reveal interesting features of the target system, such as what genes are part of the same 
regulatory networks, or even aspects of the regulatory network structure (Basso et al. 2005). 
Similarly, in most resting state fMRI studies, researchers are seeking to learn about activation 
patterns and networks without necessarily controlling particular input or cognitive tasks. More 
precisely, given a “resting” participant, neuroscientists define a set of seed regions (or voxels), 
obtain a BOLD time series for each region, and measure the extent to which those time series are 
correlated (Power, Schlaggar and Petersen 2014).37 These correlations in the BOLD signal are 
known as “functional connectivity” patterns. It is important to note that functional connectivity 
patterns are strictly correlational, unlike “effective connectivity” patterns, which aim to encode 
                                                
37 While correlating BOLD time series for predefined seed regions is still the most common way of analyzing 
resting state fMRI data (Fox, et al., 2005), independent component analysis (ICA) (see Beckman et al. 2005) is an 
increasingly popular analysis technique. Though many of our concerns apply to ICA as well, I will focus on the 
traditional way of analyzing resting state data. 
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causal relationships (Friston 2011). There are limits to what researchers can infer from functional 
connectivity patterns, though they can rule out many hypotheses.38 
Data from resting state fMRI experiments are often presented as matrices of Pearson 
correlation coefficients between seed regions (e.g., a table reflecting how correlated region A is 
to Region B, Region B is to Region C, etc.) or as graphical networks in which nodes depict 
regions and edges depict functional connectivity strengths (see Bullmore and Sporns 2009). 
Strictly speaking, functional connectivity patterns only demonstrate the extent to which changes 
in blood oxygenation are correlated across the brain. To be interesting from the standpoint of 
cognition or neurobiology, these BOLD changes should reflect correlated patterns of neural 
activity rather than simply head motion, cardiac cycle, or some other confounding factor (Glover 
and Lee 1995, Friston et al. 1996, Lowe, Mock, and Sorenson 1998). There is ample evidence 
that functional connectivity patterns do reflect real neural activity: for example, BOLD 
fluctuations at rest have been shown to correspond to electrocorticography measurements in 
surgical patients (e.g., He et al. 2008). Also, several studies indicate that structural and functional 
connectivity correlate with one another, which is expected if resting state fluctuations reflect 
neural signaling rather than motion-related or physiological artifacts. For instance, Johnston and 
colleagues (2008) found that functional connectivity relationships between the hemispheres were 
intact prior to, but dropped precipitously after, a patient received a complete section of the 
corpus callosum.  
Thus functional connectivity patterns inferred from resting state data likely reveal 
something about the brain’s functional—i.e. metabolic and/or cognitive—organization and 
                                                
38 For example, if Region A and Region B exhibit a high degree of functional connectivity, it could be that 
activation in A causes activation in B, that activation in B causes activation in A, that both are activated by region C, 
and so forth. 
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behavior. The question is: How should neuroimagers interpret these patterns? Before considering 
some of the main uses and interpretations of resting state fMRI, I need to clarify the so-called 
“resting state” itself. Some authors (e.g., Snyder and Raichle 2012) understand “rest” as a 
particular kind of brain activity that is intrinsic or internally-driven as opposed to response-
driven. According to this view, when participants are not asked to perform a particular task, 
intrinsic physiological or cognitive processes begin to predominate the BOLD signal at particular 
timescales. But Morcom and Fletcher (2007) and Klein (2014) both argue that we should be 
skeptical about inferences from (a) the operational notion of “rest” as undirected time in the 
scanner, to (b) “rest” as a particular kind of intrinsic brain state. As they argue, there is no 
guarantee that the brain defaults to intrinsic or internally guided processes simply because 
participants have no explicit task instructions from the experimenter. Instead, participants may be 
engaged in a number of “hidden” tasks such as wondering when the session will be over, 
pondering the weird noises the scanner is making, or planning a trip to Europe. For all we know, 
“resting” participants may engage in some unknown combination of the cognitive processes 
(e.g., top-down control of attention, episodic memory, etc.) that experimenters target individually 
in task-based studies. These critiques suggest that whatever the eventual value of resting state 
analyses, we ought not assume (though it may turn out to be the case) that the “resting state” is a 
unique kind of brain state. 
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4.2.2 Interpretations of resting state data 
 
(i) Task-Anticorrelated Networks 
 
Resting state fMRI is most famously associated with the discovery of the so-called 
“default mode network,” a network of regions including parts of prefrontal cortex, cingulate 
cortex, medial temporal lobes, etc. that are more active, and whose activity is more correlated 
with one another, at rest compared to during a task (Biswal et al. 1995, Grecius et al. 2003; 
Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008). The identification of the default mode network 
led researchers to theorize that it represents the intrinsic, endogenous, ongoing processes that are 
not involved in any particular task-based cognition (Shulman et al. 1997, Raichle et al. 2001). 
For this approach, the main purpose of resting state fMRI is to measure spontaneous activity in 
regions that are uniquely correlated or active at rest. Analyses of these resting state data are, on 
this interpretation, thought to reveal endogenous or internally guided neural processes that are 
the brain’s “default” state of self-reflection, internal monitoring, future thinking, and so forth. 
However, there is little consensus about what, if anything, is actually being done by this default 
mode network, even though it has been identified in many studies in fMRI and other imaging 
modalities such as positron emission tomography (PET) (Gusnard and Raichle 2001, Raichle et 
al. 2001). Some hypotheses include generating stimulus-independent thoughts, monitoring the 
external environment, imagination, self-reflection, past and future oriented thinking, and more 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008, Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng 2014). 
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(ii) An Absolute Baseline 
Another reason to perform resting state analyses is to provide an absolute baseline for 
task-related fMRI (see Gusnard and Raichle 2001). This interpretation holds that physiological 
baselines obtained using positron emission tomography (PET), can provide an absolute 
physiological baselines for interpreting task-based changes in PET and fMRI. In standard 
subtraction designs (see Section 1), neuroimagers compare activity in a task of interest to a 
matched control. Most people think that relevant brain regions become more active during the 
task of interest (e.g., reading a meaningful word) compared to a control task (e.g., reading a 
meaningless non-word), but sometimes, a region is less active during the focal task; these are 
known as “deactivations” in the neuroimaging literature (Gusnard and Raichle 2001). In these 
cases, it is unknown whether the deactivated area is being actively suppressed (e.g., due to 
inhibitory influences from other regions), or is merely less active in that condition. According to 
Gusnard and Raichle (2001), comparing task-related BOLD changes to a baseline obtained at 
rest can help adjudicate these issues. For example, some regions exhibit deactivation, but are 
fairly close to their baseline resting levels, while in other cases, a region exhibits deactivation, 
and is significantly below its resting value. This suggests that perhaps resting state data should be 
collected and used as a physiological baseline against which to interpret task-related BOLD 
changes in other experiments. 
 
(iii) Correspondences Between Rest and Tasks 
Many studies report similarities between resting and task-evoked functional connectivity 
patterns (Greicius et al. 2003, Fox and Raichle 2007, Smith et al. 2009, Bray et al. 2015, Cole et 
al. 2014). For example, the default mode network is implicated in certain tasks including 
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autobiographical recall (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng 2014). Smith and colleagues 
(2009) compared a meta-analysis of task-evoked co-activations (i.e. what regions tend to be 
activated together in particular tasks) to resting state functional connectivity patterns. They found 
that regions whose activity is correlated at rest tend to be co-activated in tasks: for example, 
previously defined visual or motor areas often exhibit a high degree of functional connectivity. 
Several studies argue that functional connectivity analyses imply the existence of a small number 
of large-scale intrinsic connectivity or resting state networks (abbreviated ICNs and RSNs, 
respectively) that correspond to specific cognitive domains—these networks include a dorsal 
attentional network, a frontoparietal control network, visual networks, motor networks, and more 
(Damoiseaux et al. 2006, Power et al. 2011, Bray et al. 2015). Crucially, though, these networks 
are thought to be few in number, and relatively stable over time. For example, they might reflect 
background activity in the brain’s major functional “pathways.” In general, they are thought to 
be qualitatively different from the types of networks that are found using standard task-based 
fMRI experiments. 
An exciting example of this approach is Vahdat and colleagues’ (2011) use of resting 
state fMRI to characterize the functional networks involved in motor learning. They report that, 
as one might predict, motor learning corresponded to changes in functional connectivity patterns 
between cerebellar cortex, dorsal premotor cortex, and primary motor cortex. Furthermore, they 
report that changes in a novel functional connectivity network (involving somatosensory cortex, 
ventral premotor cortex, and supplementary motor cortex) corresponded to perceptual changes 
accompanying motor learning. These results suggest that resting state fMRI can be used to 
identify novel functional brain networks—for example, researchers might characterize a new 
RSN (a set of regions not previously associated with one another) and then search the existing 
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task-based literature to see what functions the network might perform (Power et al. 2011). These 
studies reflect a departure from a special interest in “resting” functions to a conception of the 
field where neuroimagers identify task-related functional networks by probing connectivity in 
the resting brain. According to this view of resting state fMRI, resting state analyses might reveal 
candidate functional networks, even if it is unclear what those networks are doing. This would 
constitute a revolutionary, data-driven “bottom-up” approach to brain mapping, but also assumes 
that the networks found in these data analyses are relatively stable, which is exactly the target of 
our critique (Section 4.3). 
 
(iv) The Diagnostic Value of Functional Connectivity Structures 
 
Finally, some uses of resting state fMRI do not involve attribution of specific functions to 
resting state networks or even the assumption that functional connectivity patterns reflect 
candidate functional networks. Instead, some researchers use resting state fMRI for purely 
diagnostic purposes. For example, a number of resting state fMRI studies demonstrate that 
patients with Tourette’s syndrome (Church et al. 2009), schizophrenia (Arbabshirani, Castro, and 
Calhoun 2014), or depression (Sheline et al. 2010) exhibit characteristically altered functional 
connectivity patterns. Similarly, functional connectivity patterns can be used to predict the 
severity of brain lesions at different sites. For example, Power et al. (2011) report that regions 
characterized as “hubs” in a functional connectivity network defined using resting state data 
could reliably predict the severity of neuropsychological deficits resulting from focal lesions to 
the area. These studies suggest that resting state analyses may have substantial predictive or 
diagnostic value, even if they have less value for brain mapping or network discovery. 
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4.3 THE CHALLENGE OF MIXTURE DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
4.3.1 Functional networks or sampling artifacts? 
 
Despite the different uses and interpretations of resting state fMRI data, there is widespread 
agreement that it is a valuable technique for identifying large-scale, intrinsically active, candidate 
functional networks. For instance, Bray and colleagues (2015) argue that resting state analyses 
routinely converge on large-scale brain networks for attention, vision, self-reflection, motor 
control, and many more. The inference goes as follows: since the same topographic 
“structures”—i.e. functional connectivity patterns—occur both at rest and during tasks, this 
suggests that resting state networks are (1) Coherent functional units that (2) Can sometimes be 
assigned particular cognitive functions (e.g., attention, self-reflection, or empathy). More 
colloquially, resting state data can reveal candidate functional networks whose functions can 
subsequently be attributed by comparing resting state and task-based data (e.g., Vemuri and 
Surampudi 2015). Even when resting state fMRI analyses identify novel candidate functional 
networks, they are still thought to be part of a small number of large-scale, intrinsically active 
functional brain networks (Fox et al. 2005, Bray et al. 2015). The field is moving away from the 
assumption that there are special “resting” functions (e.g., imagination), but still assumes that 
resting state data reveal a small number of “core” (in some sense) functional networks (Smith et 
al. 2009, Cole et al. 2014). 
In this section, I argue that an alternative view—the “mixture” or “superposition” view—
can account equally well for the extant data. On that view, there is no straightforward way to 
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attribute functions to resting state networks, as functional connectivity “networks” may be a kind 
of sampling artifact rather than coherent functional units in the brain. Here is the general shape 
of the worry. Resting state fMRI involves measuring BOLD correlations over relatively long 
periods of time. Functional connectivity is typically calculated in terms of correlations between 
regions over an entire scanning session, which can last as long as multiple hours. Furthermore, 
scanning protocols for resting state fMRI sometimes involve longer acquisition times (TRs) than 
task-based fMRI, since the BOLD fluctuations measured at rest are slower than most task-related 
changes (see Power, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014). The sum total of these different 
methodological choices is that resting state fMRI measurements indirectly capture the brain’s 
activity over a relatively long timescale.  
As Morcom and Fletcher (2007) note, however, the “resting” brain is a complex, dynamic 
state, in which various functional regions and networks interact with one another as participants 
imagine what they are having for dinner, remember going to the dentist last week, attend to the 
noise of the scanner, and so forth. The extent to which these cognitive activities are taking place, 
and the extent to which regions or networks associated with them interact with one another, are 
unknown since the resting state is completely unconstrained from a cognitive standpoint. 
Therefore, there is no guarantee that the large-scale functional connectivity networks reflect 
coherent functional units; instead, they may reflect a mixture or superposition of smaller, task-
related activations during the session. More generally, edges in the networks inferred by standard 
methods applied to resting state fMRI data are semantically ambiguous—they can indicate either 
actual connections or spurious correlations—and so we cannot necessarily infer the existence of 
a “default mode network,” even if multiple studies reveal similar networks. 
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It is important to be clear about the nature of the ‘mixtures’ being discussed here. At any 
given moment, the brain is a “mixture” (in the colloquial sense) of different functional processes; 
for example, reading involves word form recognition, attention, eye movement control, etc. all at 
once. Many researchers have dealt with the problem of how to disentangle these simultaneously 
occurring processes from one another. In fact, this is one of the issues that subtraction was 
intended to solve (Petersen and Fiez 1993). I have something different in mind: a mixture of 
processes occurring over time rather. That is, I suggest that resting state analyses involve 
mixtures of causally and temporally distinct brain processes: the mixture is of processes that 
occur at different times throughout the scanning session, and that potentially operate over 
different time scales. According to this proposal, a large-scale “network” identified in resting 
state research might never have been active as a single network during the scanning session; 
there might be no discrete time period during the scan in which a network with that topology was 
engaged. Instead, the “network” is simply an artifact of analyzing data from distinct sampling 
processes occurring at different times. I contend that the brain is a mixture in both senses—at a 
time and across time—but are here primarily focused on the problem of mixtures over time. 
 
4.3.2 Sampling a mixture distribution 
 
At a high level, a mixture distribution is a probability distribution that results from “mixing” 
distinct populations. One typically finds mixture distributions when multiple, heterogeneous 
populations are sampled without one knowing or measuring the populations from which each 
individual is drawn. For example, if one measured the hair length of randomly chosen students at 
a college, then the resulting distribution would likely be a mixture distribution, as the populations 
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of men and women (typically) have different distributions of hair length. There are many 
statistical questions and challenges relating to mixture distributions, such as how to estimate 
parameters of the mixed distributions, or how to determine whether a set of observations was 
probably drawn from a mixture distribution. Our primary interest here, though, is in the well-
known fact that sampling from a mixture distribution can result in spurious correlations (e.g., 
Redner and Walker, 1984; Zheng and Frey 2004).  
Consider the following example. Assume there is no correlation between height and 
beard growth in men; that is, a short man is just as likely to sport a beard as a tall one. Under 
these conditions, sampling from the population of men will likely yield a low correlation 
between height and beardedness. Now consider that, on average, women are both shorter than 
men, and much less likely to have a beard. If we take measurements of both men and women 
(and do not also measure gender), then we will likely find a correlation between height and beard 
growth. Qualitatively, the explanation for the correlation is that a short individual is more likely 
to be a woman and so less likely to have a beard, while a tall individual is more likely to be a 
man and so more likely to have a beard. That is, knowledge of an individual’s height is 
informative about his or her beardedness, even though such knowledge is uninformative if one 
looks only at men, or only at women. In this toy example, the correlation between height and 
beardedness is spurious because (by assumption) they are uncorrelated in both of the 
populations. The correlation is a sampling artifact that results from drawing individuals from a 
mixture of two populations that are heterogeneous with respect to relevant distributional 
parameters.  
This toy example involves a spurious correlation resulting from the mixture of 
populations in which the variables are uncorrelated. The opposite phenomenon can also occur: 
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two variables can be independent in the mixture distribution, even though they are correlated 
within each subpopulation. More generally, even if the qualitative existence and direction of 
correlations are the same in every subpopulation, the mixture distribution can have quite 
different correlations. Some classic statistical puzzles such as Simpson’s Paradox and the 
Berkeley graduate admissions case of the 1970’s (Bickel, Hammell, & O’Connell, 1975) arise 
because mixture distributions can have quite different qualitative features than any of the mixed 
subpopulations. The standard methodological advice in these cases is to analyze only statistically 
or causally homogeneous subpopulations, but this advice is of questionable use when our 
investigation is intended exactly to discover the causal relations that define these subpopulations 
(Cartwright, 1979, 1989). 
I hypothesize that neuroimaging of the resting brain may actually involve sampling from 
a mixture distribution. As a result, the inter-region correlations in the data, and the connectivity 
networks that are subsequently inferred, must be interpreted with corresponding caution. As 
noted earlier, the term ‘resting state’ may be something of a misnomer since the “resting” 
participant is presumably continuing to reason, consider, imagine, visualize, and more while in 
the magnet. These different types of cognition are presumably heterogeneous with respect to 
neural firing; such differences are, after all, exactly what task-evoked fMRI aims to discover. 
Therefore, the “resting state” fMRI datapoints will be drawn from a mixture distribution, with 
the particular mixture being determined by the particular sequence of cognitions for the 
particular experimental participant. Moreover, to the extent that heterogeneous cognitions can 
“co-occur” (e.g., remembering playing basketball might involve both visual and motor areas), 
then the mixture will be both within- and across-times. Since the mixture distribution can exhibit 
quite different correlations than any of its component distributions, we cannot straightforwardly 
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interpret the output of network inference methods that depend on such correlations (or 
associations, more generally). Essentially all extant methods in neuroimaging, however, use 
association information as the basis for inference. In our toy example above, we “discovered” a 
connection between two variables where none exists in any individual or sub-population. The 
worry is that networks learned from resting state fMRI data might be similarly overinterpreted.  
Although mixture distributions can be quite different than their components, certain 
properties are more plausible than others.39 In particular, if two variables are correlated in many 
or all of the component distributions, then the mixture parameters typically must be set to precise 
values in order to yield independence (or zero correlation) in the mixture distribution. In contrast, 
two variables that are independent in every component distribution will typically be correlated in 
the mixture distribution for a wide range of mixture parameters. Put more colloquially, mixture 
distributions typically create correlations or associations, rather than eliminate them. The 
exception is when a variable has roughly the same probability distribution in each of the 
component distribution; in that case, mixing typically does not create new associations. 
The mixture view thus leads to some qualitative expectations, even in the absence of 
knowledge of the particular mixture in a particular experimental participant. In general, we 
should not expect the networks inferred from resting state fMRI data to be complete (i.e., with an 
edge between every pair of variables), since some brain areas presumably have similar 
probabilities across different cognitions. However, we should expect to find that the inferred 
networks are supergraphs (i.e., have strictly more edges) of the superposition of the graphs for 
the (relevant) cognitions (Figure 4.3). Moreover, this is exactly the high-level pattern that has 
                                                
39 The claims that follow in this paragraph are all qualitative, but can be made precise by reading “implausible” as 
Lebesgue measure zero. I do not make stronger claims about probability or likelihood, however, as the standard 
Lebesgue measure might be inappropriate in some situations. I suspect that probability distributions over the 
parameters (of the mixture and component distributions) will likely exhibit significant context-dependence. 
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been found in many resting state fMRI papers: the inferred networks are supergraphs of various 
task-evoked networks that would plausibly be triggered during “free thought” (e.g., Cole, et al., 
2014). The mixture view implies that the edges in these networks (probably) come from two 
different sources—actual connections in one or more mixture component graphs, and spurious 
correlations resulting from the mixture itself—but the edges are not labeled in this way by 
(standard) network inference methods. We thus cannot reliably interpret any particular edge, 
subgraph, or even the whole inferred network. Perhaps it picks out a “default mode network” or 
perhaps specific edges correspond to actual neural connections, but existing methods do not tell 
us. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The mixture problem. Sampling from a mixture distribution can result in a structure 
that: (a) resembles the superposition of the constituent networks, and (b) has additional inferred 
edges. 
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4.3.3 More evidence for the mixture view 
 
Mixture distributions present significant inferential challenges, and I have provided some reasons 
to think that resting state fMRI time series might constitute a mixture distribution. At the same 
time, these considerations show only that the mixture view is one explanation of the available 
data, not necessarily the best or only one. In this section, I consider additional evidence that 
favors the mixture view over competitors. If my arguments are right, then we should be agnostic 
(at least) about the leading interpretation of resting state analyses: namely, that they can be used 
to identify a small number of functionally relevant large-scale brain networks. 
Underdetermination about the source of edges in an inferred network complicates the attempt to 
give functional interpretations to stable functional connectivity patterns in resting state 
analyses—both whether Network X performs a specific function and what function Network X 
might perform. I emphasize, though, that the mixture view is not committed to the (overly 
strong) claim that every network in the mixture corresponds to some conscious cognition or task. 
The mixture view is entirely consistent with some networks, both within- and across-times, being 
responsible for unconscious cognition or purely physiological functions.  
Allen, et al. (2012) give direct support for the mixture view, though on the analysis side 
rather than in data collection (see Section 4.2). They took resting state fMRI data on a large 
number of participants, but instead of finding a single network for the full time series, they 
inferred networks for much shorter segments of each individual time series.40 They then used 
these networks to infer the “network timecourse” for each participant in their database, and 
                                                
40 Specifically, they first estimated the covariance matrices for moving windows of approximately 44 seconds, and 
then clustered those matrices. The centroid covariance matrices for those clusters were then used to infer 
connectivity networks. 
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showed that most participants had multiple networks over the course of data collection (typically 
changing every 5-10 seconds during the 5-minute scan). Moreover, this “changing networks” 
model fit the data significantly better than a “static network” model, even accounting for the 
additional degrees of freedom in the former model. Allen, et al. (2012) thus provide direct 
evidence that one of the fundamental presuppositions of the mixture view—namely, resting state 
fMRI time series data are generated by different networks over time—is plausibly correct. 
Interestingly, they found some “local” (in time) networks that are quite similar to the previously 
identified default mode network, which suggests that perhaps not all inferred edges are due 
solely to conscious, task-evoked neural activity. 
Cole, et al. (2014) considered a question left open by Allen, et al. (2012): what is the 
relationship between the resting state network (inferred from the full time series) and various 
task-evoked networks? In general, Cole, et al. found that the resting state network was quite 
similar to the “multitask” network generated from multiple task-based (i.e., not resting state) 
studies. That is, the resting state network was similar to the superposition of networks produced 
by either 7 or 64 different tasks (e.g., working memory, motor, or decision making tasks). They 
additionally compared the resting state network against the network for each specific task, and 
found that the majority of the differences were edges present in the resting state network but 
absent in the task-evoked network. The mixture view predicts exactly this pattern of results since 
sampling from mixture distributions tends to generate correlations rather than eliminate them; the 
standard interpretation arguably does not. Interestingly, Cole, et al. (2014) do not endorse, or 
even seriously consider, the mixture view, but instead argue that the resting state network should 
be reinterpreted as describing the “fundamental architecture” of the brain: that is, it tells us the 
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possible connections between regions, rather than the connections used in performing any 
particular cognitive task. 
Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng (2014) provide evidence that further supports 
the mixture view in their investigation of potential subsystems composing the default mode 
network. Yeo and colleagues (2011) used a clustering algorithm to identify three default mode 
network subsystems based on functional connectivity: a “core” network, a dorsal medial 
subsystem, and a medial temporal subsystem. Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng 
performed a meta-analysis in NeuroSynth,41 asking what functional labels (from task-based 
studies) are associated with each default mode network subsystem identified by Yeo and 
colleagues. Interestingly, there were consistent functional differences between these three 
subsystems. For example, the dorsal medial subsystem was strongly associated with semantics 
and theory of mind, while the medial temporal subsystem was associated with episodic memory. 
These findings suggest that perhaps the default mode network is not a single functional network, 
but a collection of associated networks supporting different cognitive functions. 
 
4.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
If the mixture view is correct, then resting state fMRI research will need to adopt new protocols 
and analyses for identifying functional brain networks in order to account for mixtures (see 
Section 4.5). Before turning to those positive recommendations, though, I consider three main 
objections that proponents of resting state fMRI have raised, or could raise, against the mixture 
view. First, the timing and magnitude of BOLD fluctuations observed in resting state analyses do 
                                                
41 A database of fMRI images, optimized for meta-analyses: http://www.neurosynth.org	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not seem to resemble task-evoked BOLD fluctuations. Second, resting state functional 
connectivity patterns exhibit more consistency (within- and between-subjects) than the mixture 
view would predict. Third, resting state activity persists in the absence of conscious cognition 
(e.g., in anesthetized patients). In each case, I argue that the objection fails to rule out the mixture 
or superposition interpretation of resting state functional connectivity patterns. 
 
4.4.1 Objection 1: consistency of resting state functional connectivity patterns 
 
Many studies report that resting state functional connectivity patterns are highly consistent both 
between and within subjects (Damoiseaux et al. 2006, Laumann et al. 2015). Researchers have 
found a substantial degree of between-subject consistency: roughly similar functional 
connectivity patterns emerge in different subjects (Damoiseaux et al. 2006) and even in non-
human mammals such as mice (White et al. 2011) or monkeys (Vincent et al. 2007). They have 
also found within-subject consistency: idiosyncratic features of functional connectivity patterns, 
as well as the magnitude of resting BOLD fluctuations, are consistent across different scanning 
sessions for the same participant (Damoiseax et al. 2006, Laumann et al. 2015). One might argue 
that the mixture view, which holds that functional connectivity patterns are mixtures of different 
functional networks, would not predict a high degree of within-subject or between-subject 
consistency. The following example will illustrate the concern.  
One day, a participant comes into the scanner. She thinks about an upcoming trip to 
Disney World, vividly imagining the food (which evokes activity in gustatory cortex), riding the 
roller coasters (which evokes activity in visual and vestibular areas), and so forth. The next 
scanning session, the same participant spends the entire time playing songs in her head from a 
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concert she attended that week (which evokes activity in the auditory cortex). If resting state 
functional connectivity patterns are mixtures of conscious cognitive processes, we might expect 
quite different functional connectivity patterns to emerge from these sessions. Simply put, the 
worry is that since different time blocks of conscious cognition involve a mixture of different 
cognitive processes, the functional connectivity patterns arising from different scanning sessions 
should not be particularly consistent, either within- or between-subjects. 
This objection presupposes, however, that there is little-to-no consistency in the brain 
networks activated during the “free range” cognition that occurs in a resting state experiment. 
Different people and possibly other mammals, might be engaged in a common set of background 
functions during the scanning session—the proprioceptive system is monitoring changes in limb 
position, the oculomotor system is controlling eye movements, the auditory system is responding 
to scanner noises, etc. There also are plausibly a number of “typical” tasks, perhaps quite basic 
ones, which recruit a host of cognitive functions that follow one another in a predictable fashion. 
For example, accessing an episodic memory (e.g., remembering a trip to the dentist yesterday) 
might often be accompanied by mental imagery (e.g., imagining how one’s lips felt after the 
novacaine injection) and often succeeded by planning (e.g., thinking about a doctor’s 
appointment next week). Thus, a brain engaged in “free range” cognition might exhibit a 
relatively stable distribution of ongoing processes, as well as patterns in the order and temporal 
proximity of recruited processes, and other network activations.  
Moreover, the mixture view predicts that the large-scale functional connectivity networks 
identified in resting state analyses are often mixtures of related cognitive processes, since 
processes that co-occur, or succeed one another regularly, would be mixed together more often. 
Provocatively, the many different functions Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng (2014) 
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associate with the default mode network (e.g., social cognition, introspection, autobiographical 
memory, etc.) seem to be connected in just this way. It is plausible that social interactions 
frequently involve the internal monitoring of emotional or belief states, that episodic memory is 
often accompanied by introspection, etc. Whether or not this story holds, or if a similar story can 
be told for other ICNs (e.g., large-scale networks associated with attention, motor control, etc.), 
remains to be seen. Our main point here is that engaging in free range cognition over the course 
of a long scan session can result in between subject or within subject consistency in functional 
connectivity patterns, so long as cognitive processes occur, co-occur, and follow one another, in 
a regular fashion. 
 
4.4.2 Objection 2: timing and magnitude of resting state fluctuations 
 
Some authors report that the timing and magnitude of resting state BOLD fluctuations are 
different than task-evoked BOLD fluctuations (Raichle 2009, Snyder and Raichle 2012). Snyder 
and Raichle (2012) argue that resting state BOLD fluctuations are both slower and larger in 
magnitude than task-evoked BOLD changes. For them, these quantitative differences suggest 
that, “unconstrained cognition alone does not account for the greatest part of intrinsic activity” 
(Snyder and Raichle 2012, 903). However, the mixture view can easily account for these 
qualitative differences in timing between task-evoked and resting state BOLD fluctuations: if 
functional connectivity patterns arise from mixtures of cognitive processes operating at different 
time scales, then these mixtures will take place over longer time scales than their component 
processes (i.e., the phenomena that neuroscientists typically measure using cognitive tasks). As 
for the magnitude of BOLD signal changes, there are conflicting results. While Snyder and 
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Raichle (2012) report that resting BOLD fluctuations are greater in magnitude than task-evoked 
fluctuations, Damoiseaux and colleagues (2006) report that resting state fluctuations are typically 
the same magnitude as task-evoked activations. Whether this discrepancy is due to some feature 
of the experimental protocol (e.g., different instructions of what to do during “rest”) or the fact 
that the resting state is a mixture of both free range cognition and intrinsic signal remains to be 
seen. In fact, I suggest that this disagreement points towards a possible way to test some 
implications of the mixture view. 
 
4.4.3 Objection 3: resting state fluctuations persist without consciousness 
 
A more serious objection to the mixture view comes from the finding that resting state activity 
persists in heavily sedated monkeys (e.g., Vincent et al. 2007) and humans (e.g., Greicius et al. 
2008). To the extent that the mixture is composed of conscious cognitions, this result is quite 
surprising. Functional connectivity patterns measured during rest in alert participants seem to 
persist even in unconscious individuals, which makes it more plausible that resting state fMRI is 
measuring intrinsic activity. 
There are two points to make here. First, as I noted earlier, the mixture view is not 
committed to the idea that all resting state functional connectivity patterns arise from conscious 
cognition. The brain undoubtedly exhibits some degree of baseline metabolic activity, and 
essentially all cognitive theories leave room for ongoing or background activity. For example, 
predictive coding theories of the brain (e.g., Hohwy 2014) hold that the brain is constantly 
generating predictive models of the environment, and testing these models against incoming 
information, whether from external sensory input or other sources (e.g., other parts of the brain). 
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The mixture view is entirely consistent with functional connectivity patterns in resting, alert 
participants being a mix of baseline metabolic processes (neural activity present even in 
semiconscious patients), background cognitive processes (e.g., predictive coding), and free-
ranging conscious cognition. On the mixture view, the stability of certain resting state networks 
in sedated individuals (e.g., Rosazza and Minati, 2011) provides insight into one of these 
process-types, rather than implying that the mixture view is false. Moreover, studying some of 
these processes (e.g., conscious or background cognition) may require demixing methods of 
exactly the sort that I suggest in 4.5. For instance, using resting state fMRI to identify novel 
networks involved in conscious cognition might require demixing conscious activity from 
baseline metabolic activity. 
Second, the problem of mixtures I am identifying is not just a problem for studying 
conscious cognition, but a sampling problem that could also apply to purely unconscious 
cognitive or metabolic processes. Even if resting state protocols measure intrinsic neural activity, 
this activity could result from many distinct processes that are mixed together in the sampling 
process. Some proponents of resting state fMRI argue that resting state analyses measure 
intrinsic activity—i.e. activity that would persist in the absence of conscious cognition—but that 
this activity reflects preparatory or anticipatory activity in known functional systems—e.g., 
motor or visual areas (Damoiseaux et al. 2006). Imagine that one could tell from an idling car 
engine what parts work together when the engine is moving; this is roughly akin to identifying 
what brain regions work together in the resting (think idling) brain. But for resting state fMRI to 
play the role of identifying functional subsystems, whether or not the activity in these systems 
results from free-ranging cognition or baseline metabolic activity, researchers will need to 
account for the possibility of mixtures. 
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4.5 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
I now consider some of the methodological and theoretical implications of the mixture view, as it 
implies that resting state data should be collected, analyzed, and interpreted differently, though 
there are significant challenges with all of these changes. 
 
4.5.1 New tools and techniques 
 
The most obvious change implied by the mixture view is the need to use various mathematical 
and statistical techniques to try to disentangle the component networks from which the mixture is 
constructed. This is a particularly challenging problem, as there can be mixtures of networks 
both within and across times. Moreover, the component networks are not necessarily known in 
advance; determining the network structure for various cognitive activities is itself a major 
research challenge. We thus cannot simply look for evidence of different known networks, but 
rather must simultaneously infer the networks and their mixing parameters.  
There are well-established techniques for solving parts of the mixing problem, but no 
methods that can simultaneously handle all of the different complexities. For example, standard 
techniques such as independent components analysis (ICA) can extract multiple networks that 
jointly produce the observed time series data. As a result, ICA is sometimes thought to be a 
solution to mixture worries about resting state data. These methods are only reliable, however, if 
the mixture is relatively stable during the relevant time period, which is exactly what I suggest 
does not hold. Alternately, there are a number of changepoint detection algorithms (Adams and 
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MacKay, 2007; Desobry, et al., 2005) or other methods for time series segmentation (e.g., 
Gregory, Nason, and Watt, 1996; Scargle, 1998) that can determine time points at which it is 
likely that the underlying generating system has changed. One could then presumably use 
methods such as ICA within each time period to extract the component networks, though the 
reliability of this combined method would need to be evaluated. An additional complexity is that 
standard changepoint detection methods assume that there are relatively sharp breaks or 
discontinuities in the evolution of the generating system, while the mixture view allows for the 
possibility that the mixture changes slowly over time. Overall, it seems plausible that tools could 
be developed to “demix” resting state time series, but reliable, “end-to-end” methods have not 
yet been developed.42 
Even given such methods, however, many resting state experimental protocols arguably 
do not collect sufficiently fine-grained data to adequately separate the mixture components or 
changing mixture parameters.43 Most resting state researchers have used longer repetition times 
(TRs) in their studies, as these magnet settings yield improved signal-to-noise ratios without 
impairing inference about the slower changes over longer timescales that have been the principal 
focus of resting state research. More recently, resting time studies have shifted towards using 
TRs of approximately 2000 ms. The mixture view argues, however, that significant components 
of the “resting” state time series are due to networks for cognitive activities that are presumably 
changing even more rapidly than this. Thus, these data arguably lack the temporal resolution to 
adequately separate the mixture components (though see, e.g., Allen, et al., 2012). It is an open 
                                                
42 Of course, this optimism ignores the problem of inferring networks from correlations given complications such as 
time-averaging of neural activity in the BOLD signal, undersampling of fMRI measurements, and many other issues 
(e.g., Seth, Chorley, & Barnett, 2013).  
43 Thanks to David Plaut for emphasizing this worry. 
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question whether typical fMRI measurements are sufficiently “clean” and fast to enable reliable 
learning of network mixture components. 
A different, complementary approach to the mixture problem would be to collect 
additional data that further constrains the possibility space for the mixture parameters. In 
particular, the mixture view holds that at least some of the component networks are responsible 
for the individual’s conscious cognition; they are the networks responsible for remembering the 
grocery list, planning one’s route from the lab to the store, deciding whether to stop on the way 
home, and so on. Resting state experiments do not normally collect reports about participants’ 
conscious cognition or introspective mental activities. In principle, information about 
participants’ internal cognition can provide valuable constraints on the identification of mixture 
components and parameters. If an individual is visualizing at particular times, for example, then 
there should be certain similarities in the inferred networks for those times. Self-reports can 
potentially provide key information for demixing methods, even granting that conscious, 
introspectively accessible cognition is informative about only some of the brain’s activity. 
There are, however, serious concerns about obtaining these types of cognitive constraints. 
First, there are long-standing worries about the reliability of introspection and self-reporting 
(Jones and Harris, 1967; Nisbett and Ross, 1991; Schwitzgebel, 2008; Engelbert and Carruthers, 
2010). Some of these worries are not necessarily an issue in this context; participants would not 
be asked to report, for example, their reasons for action. Not all such concerns can be so easily 
dismissed, however, and so it is unclear whether these cognitive data would be sufficiently 
reliable to provide useful constraints. Second, there are methodological challenges to obtaining 
these reports. If participants are asked to report their conscious cognition in real-time, then the 
study will involve a constant task (namely, to remember one’s conscious states) and so no longer 
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be about the resting state. Even if participants give reports only afterwards, knowledge that they 
will be asked to do so can plausibly induce constant memory and metacognition tasks throughout 
the experiment. Thus, it seems that the request for (retrospective) self-reports must come as a 
surprise at the end of the study. In that case, though, one worries that participants will be relying 
on whatever information was ad hoc encoded, perhaps with significant error, in memory. It is 
simply an open empirical question whether those self-reports would be more unreliable. In any 
case, there are clearly substantial experimental challenges to obtaining self-reports of conscious 
cognition, even though such data could significantly improve demixing analyses. 
 
4.5.2 The value of resting state data 
 
An alternate, though not mutually exclusive, response is to see a different kind of value in resting 
state data. The standard framing of discussion of these experiments has been based on a 
distinction between intrinsic and task-evoked networks: resting state studies inform us about the 
former; task-specific studies inform us about the latter. The mixture view challenges, however, 
the very idea that there is a stable intrinsic network being learned from resting state data. Perhaps 
there is some persistent background network in the brain, but if the mixture view is correct, then 
it cannot be inferred transparently from resting state fMRI data. Thus, different experiment-types 
cannot be distinguished by the types of functional networks they target.  
As I suggested earlier, the core difference between these two types of experiments seems 
to be in the degree of experimental control (over brain activity) exercised by the researcher. 
Standard task-based studies involve significant control, as the participants’ cognition is 
presumably driven principally by experimental demands. In contrast, resting state studies are 
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relatively uncontrolled, often quite explicitly so. A common view is that greater experimental 
control is always better, but this claim is not correct in general; rather, it depends on what one is 
trying to learn. Significant control (including, e.g., randomization) can be the best way to 
discover whether some particular A causes some particular B. If one is instead trying to 
understand, say, the typical behavior of a system in its natural environment, then significant 
experimental control can actually impair learning, precisely because that control can change the 
system from its natural state. 
In many cases, scientists rely on exploratory experiments to map how a system operates 
in a “natural” setting—e.g., microarray studies can measure how gene transcription in a cell 
changes as the cell grows and divides (Franklin 2005). The mixture view implies that resting 
state fMRI studies could be similarly valuable for answering questions about “natural” brain 
behavior. Task-based studies are, by design, artificial in certain respects, and so potentially 
misleading about aspects of neural activity in more naturalistic settings. In particular, task-based 
studies push the individual to engage in certain cognitive activities, typically to the exclusion of 
others. As a result, there are potentially significant brain networks that have not been observed, 
simply because those networks underlie some task that has not been isolated in any particular 
experiment. Precisely because resting state studies are relatively uncontrolled, they hold forth the 
promise of revealing previously unknown or understudied brain networks. People’s free-ranging 
cognition plausibly traverses a wider space than experimenters have previously thought to 
isolate. 
 I want to emphasize that this conclusion is decidedly not a skeptical one. I am not arguing 
that the mixture view implies that all inferences from resting state connectivity patterns to 
functional networks must be ambiguous, or that all resting state studies are worthless. I 
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vehemently disagree with this assessment. My point is rather that we must be careful about the 
questions that we expect resting state studies to answer. They can be incredibly useful and 
powerful, but they must be interpreted with appropriate care. On the mixture view, these studies 
do not necessarily reveal some intrinsic, task-free, omnipresent network. They can, however, be 
used to discover new brain networks and better understand naturalistic brain activity, including 
the ways in which different networks co-occur and interact when external conditions do not 
dictate a particular goal, task, or cognition. That is, resting state fMRI studies can be (I suggest) a 
full-blooded realization of the possibilities of exploratory science. In order to do so, however, we 
must ensure that we account for mixtures by adopting the methodological and analytic 
techniques outlined earlier. 
 
4.6 EXPLORING BRAIN NETWORKS 
 
Recent work in the philosophy of experiment suggests that exploratory experiments can reveal 
interesting patterns about a system in the absence of explicit theories of how those patterns arise 
(Steinle 1997, Hall 2005). Thus successful experiments need not involve testing specific 
hypotheses under controlled settings. Resting state fMRI fits this description: it putatively 
identifies functional brain networks (via functional connectivity patterns) in a more naturalistic 
setting. However, as Franklin-Hall (née Franklin) notes (Franklin 2005), exploratory experiments 
rarely meet the Baconian ideal of theory-free observation. Instead, interpreting exploratory 
experiments involves a dense constellation of theoretical commitments about both 
instrumentation and the workings of the system in question.  
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In this chapter, I analyzed the theoretical commitments of resting state fMRI. Many 
researchers argue that the principal difference between task-based fMRI and resting state fMRI is 
that the former measures activity related to stimulus or goal driven cognitive functions while the 
latter measures intrinsic or internally driven brain activity. Researchers interpret the main finding 
in resting state research—i.e. the presence of consistent, large-scale functional connectivity 
patterns—in a number of different ways. However, a common theme in interpreting these results 
is that resting state analyses can be used to identify large-scale functional networks in advance of 
knowing what exactly those networks are doing. There is much more agreement on this point 
than on what networks there are, or what precise functions these networks may be performing. 
 My account challenges this central way of interpreting resting state research. The mixture 
view proposes that the large-scale networks identified in resting state fMRI may be sampling 
artifacts rather than genuine features of the brain’s functional organization. According to this 
view, the brain exhibits different kinds of processes (background metabolic, background 
cognitive, and free-ranging conscious cognition) that occur at different times and operate over 
different time scales. Since it is likely that resting state analyses involve mixing these temporally 
and causally distinct processes, there is currently no way to be sure that the topological 
“structures” identified in resting state research correspond to functional brain networks. 
Nevertheless, we agree that resting state analyses hold the promise of identifying novel 
functional networks, since free-ranging cognition can traverse a broader range of brain processes 
than researchers typically target in task-based studies. Accounting for the possibility of mixtures 
will improve the ability of resting state analyses to disentangle these diverse functional signals, 
and thus make good on the promise of identifying candidate functional networks in a bottom-up 
fashion. 
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5.0 DISSERTATION CONCLUSION 
5.1 THE STORY SO FAR 
 
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that fMRI studies can, in principle, inform the 
development and assessment of cognitive theories. I have also shown that the value of fRMI for 
testing cognitive theories depends on the bridging assumptions that neuroimagers use to link 
BOLD activation patterns to cognitive theories. The main philosophical problem is that recent 
developments in brain mapping—both theoretical developments such as context-sensitivity 
(McIntosh 2000) and network-oriented mapping (Sporns 2011), and methodological 
developments such as MVPA (Haxby et al. 2001) and resting state fMRI (Snyder and Raichle 
2012)—cast serious doubt on the assumptions that have typically made fMRI results speak to 
cognitive theorizing. 
I conclude that fMRI should be used not just to test cognitive theories (indeed, given the 
discussion in Chapter 3 it may be premature to expect fMRI to be useful for validating 
psychological constructs), but must also be used to test the bridging assumptions on which 
cognitive inferences rely. This is an extension of the kind of project Poldrack (2006) and 
Anderson (2010) undertook when they questioned the extent to which individual regions are 
recruited for different cognitive capacities, and what this means for reverse inference in cognitive 
neuroimaging. I recognize, however, that this general picture raises far more questions than it 
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answers. In what follows, I briefly outline some outstanding questions, and how one might 
approach them. 
   
5.2 BRAIN MAPPING: HOW BAD COULD IT BE? 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented a “modest” picture of the revisions neuroscientists will need to make 
when mapping functions onto the brain. Minimally, we should expect individual regions to be 
frequently re-deployed (Anderson 2010) and that many psychological capacities will map onto 
networks rather than any particular region (Sporns 2011). This picture has many consequences—
for one, it predicts that selective associations between structures and functions may emerge only 
at the level of large-scale brain networks. But there is no guarantee that psychological kinds will 
map neatly onto sets of brain regions. First, functional brain networks are not just collections of 
regions. The same regions may perform different functions when connected differently. For 
example, the same three regions may predict what perceptual inputs will result from performing 
a motion when engaged one way, and select which motion to perform based on perceptual inputs 
when engaged another way. This is why studying changes in effective connectivity, which 
(unlike the analyses I have examined so far) reveal the direction of influence between regions, is 
so important (Friston 2011, Pessoa 2014). 
Even more vexing, it is possible that the problem of multi-functionality I discussed in 
Chapter 2—i.e. that the same parts can perform different operations in different contexts—will 
recur at larger scales within the brain. According to this concern, large-scale brain networks may 
perform different operations depending on what coalitions of large-scale networks they are 
currently interacting with, just as regions seem to perform different functions in different neural 
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contexts. This kind of picture would greatly complicate inferences from fMRI results to 
cognitive theories. Thus, the same basic conceptual problems may recur as neuroscientists adopt 
new tools—e.g., resting state fMRI—for observing brain activity at different scales. Of course, 
determining whether and in what sense a large-scale brain network is multi-functional will 
require dealing with problems like the mixture problem discussed in Chapter 4, since the 
appearance of a large, multi-functional network may be a sampling artifact in some instances. 
Another issue concerns the extent to which analyses developed to understand one brain 
system will apply to another. My account in Chapter 2 suggests that not only will each brain 
region perform some characteristic operation, but also each region may be capable of performing 
different operations in different contexts. While it remains speculative that this more radical form 
of context-sensitivity (i.e. performing different computations or operations in different contexts) 
is found within human cortex, it is found in a number of other biological systems. But while I 
emphasize functional heterogeneity, a number of neuroscientists (e.g., Carandini and Heeger 
2012) and philosophers (e.g., Chirimuuta 2014) have argued that neural circuits reuse the same 
canonical computations in a number of different capacities. If this kind of picture is true, then 
perhaps neuroscientists will be able to understand cognition as the combination and 
recombination of a fairly circumscribed number of computational elements. The extent to which 
different regions perform the same kinds of operations is an important, yet unresolved, 
theoretical issue. 
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5.3 COGNITIVE ONTOLOGY REVISION: A ROADMAP 
 
My dissertation raises a number questions about what fMRI can contribute to testing our 
taxonomy of psychological kinds. Poldrack (2010) advocates testing our cognitive ontologies in 
a “top down” fashion. This project involves carefully spelling out the taxonomic relationships 
between our cognitive constructs—e.g., response inhibition, task switching, and working 
memory—and then using fMRI to test whether or not these constructs seem to correspond to the 
same brain processes (Lenartowicz et al. 2010, Poldrack 2010). In this approach, scientists can 
develop their cognitive ontology independently of brain data, and then use brain data to validate 
and refine it. By contrast, Anderson (2014, Ch. 4) articulates a radical, “bottom up,” form of 
fMRI-based cognitive ontology revision. In this approach, neuroimagers will use dimension 
reduction analyses to uncover common activation patterns between disparate tasks, and thereby 
identify novel cognitive constructs. 
But perhaps both strategies are the wrong way to go about revising our cognitive 
ontologies. Instead of framing their experiments as a “test” of some cognitive theory, many 
neuroscientists are instead merely attempting to redefine the functions of brain areas. For 
example, Aminoff, Kveraga, and Barr (2013) developed the notion of “contextual processing,” to 
explain the parahippocampal cortex’ involvement in spatial navigation, scene processing, and a 
host of other functions. While it is hard to find examples where fMRI data outright contradicts 
some cognitive theory (see Chapter 3), neuroscientists seem to be developing new vocabularies 
for describing the contribution of brain regions to cognition. Gauthier et al. (2001) talk of “visual 
expertise” rather than face recognition. Menon and Uddin (2010) implicate the anterior insula in 
“salience detection,” a form of metamodal processing involved in detecting both internal and 
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external changes in the environment. Perhaps this process of re-describing the functions of brain 
regions (and developing computational models based on these reconceived functions) will result 
in a kind of cognitive ontology revision that little resembles using fMRI to “test” our cognitive 
theories. 
 
5.4 MENTAL FUNCTION AND CEREBRAL CARTOGRAPHY 
 
The central lessons of this dissertation are as follows. First, theories of the brain’s functional 
topography interact with, and in many cases determine, the value of fMRI for testing cognitive 
theories. The taxonomic and cartographic projects outlined in Chapter 1 are deeply dependent on 
each other. Second, since theories of the brain’s functional topography are currently in flux, so 
too are the cognitive inferences neuroscientists can draw from fMRI data. Therefore, 
neuroscientists will need to use fMRI, and other methods, to test these bridging assumptions. 
Finally, the bridging assumptions that ultimately bring fMRI into contact with cognitive theories 
will likely need to be far more “local”—i.e. specific to inferences in particular experimental 
paradigms, or about particular brain systems—than previous researchers have recognized. 
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